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Abstract 
Ten years after the event and the question as to exactly why a driver passed a 
signal at danger to cause the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster is still an open one.  This 
paper uses the literature on human error and cognition, combined with critical path 
analysis, to provide further insight.  Five aspects of train operation are drawn out of 
the known facts surrounding the incident: custom and practice in the use of the 
Driver‟s Reminder Appliance, operation and use of the Automatic Warning System, 
the sequence of signalling information, methods of supplying route information, and 
speed restrictions.  Associated with each are several important human factors issues 
which, combined, give rise to five potential explanations.  Critical path analysis is 
used to map these explanations onto the known facts of the situation.  It is suggested 
that the proximal cause of the Ladbroke Grove rail crash was a combination of an 
association-activation error and a mode error (leading the driver to mistakenly assume 
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he had activated the Reminder Appliance) together with a loss-of-activation error (the 
driver failing to remember that a previous signal was showing caution) and a data-
driven-activation error (by associating an in-cab warning to the wrong external 
source).  The findings support the original inquiry recommendations, but also go 
further into predictive methods of detecting problems at the human/transport system 
interface.  
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Introduction 
Ladbroke Grove has become shorthand for Lord Cullen‟s inquiry report whose 
recommendations had a wide ranging impact on the UK railway industry.  Ladbroke 
Grove itself is a suburban district located in West London through which the London 
to West Country main line runs.  It is approximately two miles from the line's 
terminus, London Paddington.  It was at this location, at 08:09 on the 5th October 
1999, that an outbound three car commuter train collided with an eight coach high 
speed train at a combined speed of 130mph, injuring over 400 people and causing the 
deaths of 31, including both drivers.  Although accidents like this are extremely rare 
on the UK rail network, this incident was the result of a long-standing human factors 
problem – a Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD).   
A SPAD is when a train driver passes a signal displaying a stop aspect.  To the 
outside observer, problems like this appear deeply perplexing.  How is it possible that 
a driver can acknowledge up to three in cab warnings, override three automatic 
applications of the emergency brake, but still proceed past a point at which he or she 
is required to stop?  Within the scientific community, and despite a considerable body 
of research, this category of problem is far from fully resolved: SPADs have occurred 
for well over a hundred years and still occur to this day, with many examples 
remaining stubbornly resistant to a wide range of well intentioned safety measures.  
SPADs are more than specific incidents, they also represent a perplexing „category‟ of 
human factors problem, a category that is to be found in virtually all transport 
domains.  Road transport, for example, has „unintended acceleration‟ (e.g. Schmidt, 
1989) and „highway hypnosis‟ (e.g. May & Gale, 1998).  Aviation has „controlled 
flight into terrain‟ (e.g. Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003), „mode errors‟ (e.g. Endsley & 
Kiris, 1995) and „automation surprises‟ (e.g. Sarter & Woods, 1997).  What all these 
cases share in common are functioning safety systems which are defeated or ignored, 
leading to perfectly serviceable vehicles being placed in highly dangerous conditions.   
The problem with SPADs (and SPAD-like phenomenon) is that they appear 
both paradoxical yet simple.  After all, the task of the driver is to spot a signal 
displaying a stop indication and apply the brakes.  But this apparent simplicity is 
misleading.  In the case of the Ladbroke Grove rail crash a clue to the presence of 
deeper, more psychological issues is revealed by the fact that the inquiry team had no 
doubt that the driver believed he had a proceed aspect showing at the last signal he 
passed.  The report, furthermore, alludes to the fact that “SN109 [the code given to the 
signal that was passed at danger] was a multi-SPAD signal” (Cullen, 2001, pg 2) 
meaning that the driver in question was not alone in passing this particular signal at 
danger. 
Although the Ladbroke Grove accident happened ten years ago SPADs still 
occur.   An opportunity exists to re-visit Ladbroke Grove and go beyond the official 
enquiry report into the misleadingly simple question of „why‟ the driver in question 
passed a signal he was not meant to.  The inquiry report invites such analysis.  In the 
words of Lord Cullen, the inquiry chairman, “...it is not possible for me to arrive at a 
full explanation of [the driver‟s] actions” (Cullen, 2001, para 5.111, p. 80).  The 
question of specifically „why‟ the driver passed the signal is therefore an open one.   
Several authors have responded to this opportunity previously and have used 
the great depth of information provided by the formal investigation to try and go 
further.  Lawton and Ward (2005) and Santos-Reyes and Beard (2006) both adopt a 
systems approach, shifting the level of analysis to encompass the combined effects of 
the operational and organisational environment.  Both conclude, quite rightly, that 
train crashes like this cannot be distilled into a single causal factor and that a systemic 
failure took place which enabled direct, indirect, latent and active factors to propagate 
through the interacting system elements.  A paper by Evans (2005) presents an 
interesting counterpoint.  Despite the severity of the Ladbroke Grove accident, and the 
public perceptions which surrounded it, rail safety continued its improving trend 
regardless.  This brings into sharp relief a particular facet of SPADs as a category of 
human factors problem; their low probability but extremely high cost.   
This unfortunate probability/cost trade-off, requires a particularly fine grained 
analysis.  The present paper aims to make a contribution of this sort by shifting the 
systemic level of analysis closer to the accident itself.  It does this by looking at the 
interacting psychological mechanisms underpinning the actions and behaviour of the 
driver who committed the SPAD.  The paper combines the known facts of the 
Ladbroke Grove incident with the latest knowledge of human factors in order to 
develop a number of plausible explanations for the accident, which can then be 
evaluated.  This probing is intended to go further than the inquiry report and respond 
to the tacit invitation therein: simply, why did the driver believe SN109 was 
displaying a proceed aspect?  Given that a similar class of problem occurs in most 
other high reliability domains, additional insight into the underlying psychological 
mechanisms is as valuable as it is transferrable.  The remainder of the introduction 
deals with the events leading up to the crash and wider aspects of rail operations 
which have a bearing on understanding its cause.    
 
Timeline of Events 
In order to understand the situation and context surrounding the Ladbroke 
Grove rail accident it is necessary to re-play the train journey in question.   
It is 08:05 on the 5
th
 October 1999.  A „Thames Turbo‟ multiple unit 
commuter train, identifying number 1K20, is waiting on platform 9 of London‟s 
Paddington station.  On board are the driver and 147 passengers.   
At 08:06 the On-Train Monitoring and Recording (OTMR) equipment and 
records from the computerised signalling centre show that the train passed the signal 
(code number SN17) at the end of the platform.  SN17 was showing a green aspect 
(proceed) and an illuminated number four (indicating that the train would be routed to 
line four).  So called „starting signals‟ at the ends of platforms in terminus stations 
like Paddington do not have the Automatic Warning System (AWS) fitted to them, 
thus no audible or visual indication of SN17‟s signal aspect would be provided in the 
cab.   
Between SN17 and SN43 (the next signal in sequence) the driver gradually 
increased speed to 34 mph.  He did this by moving the speed control successively up 
through seven speed notches in the following order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7.  Two speed 
restriction signs were passed, one reading 40mph and later one reading 60mph.   
The next signal, code number SN43, was showing a green aspect (proceed) 
and an illuminated number four, indicating that the train would be continuing along 
line four.  200 yards from SN43 the Automatic Warning System (AWS) triggered an 
audible „chime‟ in the cab, confirming to the driver that SN43 was showing a proceed 
aspect and that he need not perform any actions additional to those already being 
performed.  From this point, speed increased further to 44 mph. 
The next signal had the code number SN63 and it was showing a double 
yellow aspect.  This means „preliminary caution‟ and that two signalised sections of 
track ahead are clear but that the third is occupied.  This signal was not presenting any 
route information meaning that the driver could assume he was staying on the same 
track.  Approximately 200 yards before the signal, the AWS triggered a horn sound in 
the cab and gave the driver six seconds to press the AWS cancel button in order to 
prevent an automatic application of the train‟s brakes.  The driver correctly pressed 
the button causing the horn sound to stop and the in-cab AWS display to change 
colour.  The display now provided an ongoing reminder that the last AWS activation 
was a warning.  Shortly after SN63, the driver put the speed control in the neutral 
position and applied the brake at level one for about seven seconds, enough to reduce 
speed from 44 to 39 mph as it approached the next signal in sequence, SN87. 
SN87 was displaying a single yellow aspect meaning „caution‟, only the next 
signalised section of track is clear and that the next signal is likely to be at danger.  
Route information was also being displayed on an associated „position light junction 
indicator‟ where a row of white coloured lights was pointing left.  This informed the 
driver that the train was going to be routed onto the adjacent left-hand line after the 
next signal.  Again, 200 yards from SN87 the AWS horn sounded in the cab and a 
request for an automatic application of the brakes was cancelled.  The in-cab AWS 
display remained in its previous state and provided an ongoing reminder of the last 
AWS indication received (i.e. a warning).  At this point, it would have been normal 
practice for the driver to start slowing down in order to stop in advance of the next 
signal.  In this case, however, the train continued to coast for another 30 seconds.   
The next signal, SN109, was displaying a red aspect meaning stop.  
Approximately 200 yards before SN109 the train passed over the associated 
Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment on the track.  A warning horn was 
received in the cab and a request for an automatic brake application was once again 
cancelled.  The in-cab AWS display remained in the state that had been triggered by 
SN43 (two signals previously) and the driver moved the speed controller from notch 
zero (coasting) to notch 5.  This kept the train cruising at around 38mph.   
Just ahead of SN109 were two speed restriction signs located at the trackside.  
The first was a round sign warning of an 85mph restriction, the second was a 
triangular warning sign referring to a 70mph restriction on the crossover to the right.  
Concurrent with the signs, the driver moved the speed controller from notch five to 
notch seven (maximum).  The train accelerated past SN109 at danger, the only in-cab 
warning for this event having been cancelled by the driver approximately two seconds 
previously.  The only alarms raised as the train entered a section of track it was not 
meant to were those in the remote signalling centre 15 miles away in Slough.  The 
signaller in charge of monitoring the situation made an attempt to halt an approaching 
train by turning a signal with the code number SN120 from green (proceed) to red 
(stop).  The driver of the train travelling in the opposite direction, a high speed train 
comprised of eight coaches with a power-car at each end, immediately applied the 
brakes. 
Thirty six seconds after selecting speed control notch seven, with the Thames 
Turbo‟s speed now approaching 50mph, the On-Train Monitoring and Recording 
(OTMR) equipment showed that the driver moved the control from notch seven 
straight to notch zero (the neutral position) followed immediately by an application of 
the emergency brake.   
Five seconds later the Thames Turbo collided with the High Speed Train near 
to signal SN120.  The combined speed of impact was 130mph. 
The events and surrounding context have been assembled into Figure 1 which 
is based on data from the On-Train Monitoring and Recording (OTMR) equipment 
and the known layout of the rail infrastructure. 
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Figure 1 – Schematic of Ladbroke Grove event timeline 
Defences in Depth 
The railway system, like all safety-critical systems, has multiple layers of 
defences each with the potential to prevent an accident (Reason, 1990, 1988).  
Multiple defences have the benefit that should any one defence fail, there will be 
other defences in place to prevent anything untoward occurring.  Reason argues that 
in reality these defences tend to interact dynamically with local demands and human 
error.  As shown in Table 1, there were at least seven such defences in place on the 
day of the incident, with the driver managing to defeat the last five.  Specifically, had 
the driver not selected the speed control notch 5, or had applied the DRA after SN87, 
or correctly identified the automatic warning at SN109, or not selected the speed 
control notch 7, it is probable that the accident either would not have occurred or not 
been as devastating as it was.   
 
Table 1 – Analysis of defences in depth 
Defences-in-depth Driver response Train response 
1.  SN63 AWS horn Cancel AWS AWS horn cancelled 
2.  SN63 at double yellow Select speed control notch 0 
and brake level 1 applied and 
released 
Train coasting at 45mph then 
braking to 41mph and 
coasting to 39mph  
3.  SN87 AWS horn Cancel AWS AWS horn cancelled 
4.  SN87 at single yellow Allow train to continue 
coasting for 30 seconds, then 
select speed control notch 5 
Train coasting at 39mph then 
cruising at 38mph 
5.  Driver Reminder  
Appliance 
Not applied Train coasting but driver is 
still able to draw power 
6.  SN109 AWS horn Cancel AWS 
Select speed control notch 7 
AWS horn cancelled 
Train accelerating from 
38mph to 50mph 
7.  SN109 at red No response Train accelerating from 
38mph to 50mph 
 
 
The Ladbroke Grove accident clearly follows a trajectory through each layer 
of defence which, for a host of interacting local and global reasons, had aligned in 
such a way as to permit the crash to take place.  The multiple defences in the system 
offer an explanation as to why these events are so rare and why problems like SPADS 
appear, on the surface, to be so unique and perplexing.   
 
Background to Driver Operations 
At first sight, it seems inconceivable that a driver can acknowledge the receipt 
of no less than three warnings, each one requiring the cancellation of an automatic 
emergency brake request, yet still fail to stop at a red signal.  But as numerous studies 
have shown, it does happen (e.g. Hall, 1999; Andersen, 1999; Williams, 1977; Van 
der Flier & Schoonman, 1988; Gilchrist, 1990; Gibson, 1999; Downes & Robinson, 
1999; May, Horberry & Gale, 1996; Wright, Ross & Davies, 2000; Hill, 1995).  All of 
these sources allude to the broader context of train driving operations as an 
explanation for the counter-intuitive nature of SPADS, a context which can now be 
explored in more detail.   
 
We begin with a lay-man‟s description of train driving provided by a driver in 
a focus group: 
 
“The best way to describe [driving a train] is a bit like having to drive your 
car on ice – at 100 mph – with only the handbrake to slow you down.” (McLeod, 
Walker & Moray, 2003: 2005).   
 
It takes approximately two miles for a train travelling at 125mph to be brought 
to a complete halt.  As a result, it is comparatively rare for a driver to begin braking 
from high speed for an event that can, at that moment, be clearly seen ahead.  Rather 
like pilots who make extensive use of their instruments, train drivers rely heavily on 
information conveyed to them by line-side signals.  This combines with in-depth route 
knowledge to generate a response (like braking or acceleration) which is appropriate 
for the circumstances.  What this means is that the kind of feedback control 
encountered in car driving, where a driver will see a red traffic light and apply the 
brakes in order to stop before it, does not often apply.  Neither do the simple Input 
(i.e. red traffic light) –Processing (i.e. what is the braking distance) -Output (i.e. apply 
the brakes) models of cognition frequently encountered in human factors apply 
particularly well to SPADs.  This is because „the input‟ is derived indirectly and 
constructed from an expectation of what is ahead.  Train driving is characterized by 
large amounts of this predictive, feed-forward control, with drivers being actively 
required to believe that certain system states are imminent based on what they know 
currently:  they could not control a train at speed otherwise.  The key in railway 
operations is to ensure those beliefs and predictions, and the corresponding 
behaviours, are correct.  Put simply, because drivers have to prepare to stop for up to 
two miles, and several signals in advance, the problem becomes less to do with 
signals being passed at danger and more to do with other events, principally the 
succession of previous signals passed at caution.   
 
Psychological Mechanisms in Error Production 
In order to relate train driving operations to the system defences that were 
defeated in the run up to the Ladbroke Grove crash, it is necessary to consult the 
psychological literature on human error, working memory and attention.   
 
Interactive Schemata 
Norman (1981) reports research on the categorisation of action slips based on 
an analysis of 1,000 incidents.  Underpinning the analysis was a psychological theory 
of schema activation.  He argued that action sequences are triggered by knowledge 
structures organised as memory units and called schemas.  The mind comprises a 
hierarchy of schemas that are invoked (or triggered) if particular conditions are 
satisfied or events occur.  Related to this is Neisser‟s (1976) seminal work on 
„Cognition and Reality‟, where he puts forward a view of how human thought is 
closely coupled with a person‟s interaction with the world.  He argues that knowledge 
of how the world works (e.g. schemas) leads to certain kinds of information being 
expected, which in turn directs behaviour to seek it out and provide a ready means of 
interpreting the situation.  During the course of events, as the environment is sampled, 
the information serves to update and modify the internal cognitive schema of the 
world, which will again direct further search.   
The perceptual cycle can be used to explain human information processing in 
train driving.  Assuming that the individual has the correct route knowledge for 
operating the train, their schema will enable them to anticipate events (such as the 
signals and signs they expect to see and routes they expect to take), search for 
confirmatory evidence (such as looking at the signal aspect, trackside objects, routing 
information, speed indicators and notes), direct a course of action (such as braking 
and accelerating) and continually check that the outcome is as expected (such as the 
slowing down or the speeding up of the train).  If they uncover some data they do not 
expect (such as an unexpected warning or track routing) they are required to source a 
wider knowledge of the world to consider possible explanations that will direct future 
search activities.  The completeness of this model is in the description of process (the 
cyclical nature of sampling the world) and product (the updating of the world model 
at any point in time).   
 
Error Taxonomy 
The interactive schema model works well for explaining how we act in the 
world and what can go wrong.  As Norman's (1981) research shows, it may also 
explain why errors occur as they do.   If, as schema theory predicts, action is directed 
by schemata, then faulty schemata, or faulty activation, will lead to erroneous 
performance.  As Table 2 shows, this can occur in at least three main ways.  First, we 
can select the wrong schema due to misinterpretation of the situation.  Second, we can 
activate the wrong schema because of similarities in the trigger conditions.  Third, we 
can activate schemas too early or too late.   
 Table 2 - Taxonomy of errors with examples 
Taxonomy of errors Examples of error types 
Errors that result from the 
formation of intention 
Mode errors: erroneous classification of the situation 
Description errors: ambiguous or incomplete specification of 
intention 
Errors that result from faulty 
activation of schemas 
Loss-of-activation errors: schemas that lose activation after they 
have been activated  
Data-driven-activation errors: external events that cause the 
activation of schemas 
Association-activation errors: currently active schemas that activate 
other schemas with which they are associated 
Capture errors: similar sequences of action, where stronger 
sequence takes control 
Errors that result from faulty 
triggering of active schemas 
Blend errors: combination of components from competing schemas 
Premature activation errors: schemas that are activated too early 
Failure to activate errors: failure of the trigger condition or event to 
activate the schema 
 
Reference to the known facts of the Ladbroke Grove crash described above, 
and to the error types shown in Table 2, shows only weak evidence for a description 
error, association-activation error, capture errors or blend/premature/failure to activate 
errors.  The driver demonstrated no apparent ambiguity in his intention and made no 
attempt to correct his actions.  This, in turn, supports a view that the actions being 
performed were consistent with individual schemas.  The known facts (particularly 
the OTMR data) also support the view that actions were carried out in response to, 
and apparently triggered by, external stimuli.  What the known facts do communicate, 
however, is stronger evidence for a loss-of-activation error, followed by a mode error, 
followed again by a data-driven-activation error.  These error types also fit the 
timeline of events well: for example, the driver fails to remember that he has passed a 
single yellow at SN87, perhaps confuses the coasting of the train with application of 
the DRA and then, possibly, mistakes the speed restriction as the cause of the 
activation of SN109‟s in-cab automatic warning.  Specific explanations will be 
developed shortly, for the time being it seems reasonable to suspend further 
consideration of the former error types (description, association-activation, capture, 
blend, premature, failure to activate) in favour of the latter three (loss of activation, 
mode and data-driven).  These are taken forward in the next sections. 
 
Loss of Activation Error 
There are two main ways in which information is lost from working memory: 
displacement and decay.  In displacement, older information is displaced from 
working memory by newer information.  Working memory has upper limits on 
capacity of (see Miller‟s classic 1956 work).  This means that as the journey 
progresses, information about signals and signs passed will be displaced by more 
recent signs and signals.  In decay, information is forgotten as time elapses.  The more 
information held in working memory the faster it decays.  Individual chunks (such as 
remembering a single yellow aspect at a previous signal) have a half-life in working 
memory of approximately 70 seconds (the delay after which recall is reduced by one 
half: see Card, Moran & Newell, 1986).  Whilst this is well within the actual time 
taken by the driver to travel from SN87 to SN109 (the journey took approximately 30 
seconds) the half-life is reduced by a factor of ten when the numbers of chunks are 
tripled (such as remembering route information and speed restrictions in addition to 
remembering a single yellow aspect at the signal just passed).  The loss of information 
from working memory is thus plausible in these circumstances. 
 
 
Mode Error 
Norman (1981) singles out mode errors as requiring special attention in the 
design of technological systems.  He pointed out that the misclassification of the 
mode that the system was in could lead to input errors which may have serious 
effects.  Woods et al (1994) state that mode errors occur when there is a breakdown in 
situation assessment.  They argue that keeping track of the mode that a system is in 
increases the demands placed on memory and situation assessment.  In the present 
case, the loss of activation error seems to have compounded the problem by giving the 
driver a mistaken belief as to the current mode.  The selection of notch 5 on the speed 
control just before SN109 is consistent with a mode error, and the driver‟s mistaken 
belief that he had not passed a previous signal displaying caution and therefore would 
not be expecting to see a signal displaying danger.   
 
Data Driven Activation Error 
The third error, the attribution of an in-cab warning at referring to SN109 
incorrectly to a nearby speed restriction sign, is consistent with the driver‟s almost 
immediate selection of speed control notch 7 (the data-driven-activation error).  The 
concept of limited pools of attentional resources (Wickens, 1992) is relevant here.  
The basic premise is that allocation of attentional resources to one task will result in 
fewer resources available for another.  For example, attentional resources focused on 
detecting hazards or checking the line ahead for crossovers will mean that there are 
fewer resources available for determining alternative courses of action and executing 
manual responses.   
Attention has often been described using the metaphor of a searchlight 
(Barber, 1988).  The direction of the driver‟s attention is like the beam of the 
searchlight and everything that falls within the beam of the searchlight is processed.  
The limits of human attention can cause problems in the train driving task in cases 
where the driver is required to focus on some stimuli rather than others, is distracted 
and/or too thinly divided across too many concurrent tasks.  There are two main 
factors to be considered: attentional resources and direction of visual focus.  These 
factors offer an explanation for the demands placed upon the driver at SN109.  On 
hearing and cancelling the in-cab warning referring to SN109‟s signal aspect (i.e. red) 
the driver‟s visual attention may have focused on the speed restriction sign below the 
bridge.  The information perceived and processed within the attentional “searchlight” 
is highly detailed, whilst the surrounding information tends to be perceived and 
processed in a peripheral manner.  Whilst the driver may have been very aware of the 
speed restriction signs, he may only have been vaguely aware of the overhead lines 
and signal gantry.  Of course, this goes against all driver training and common 
experience to the point of implausibility.  Yet, after cancelling the AWS the driver 
behaved in a way consistent with this by selecting speed control notch 7.  To do this 
he may have switched his attention to the controls and speed indicator inside the cab.  
By the time his attention was focused back on the line the gantry at SN109 might not 
have been within the attentional “searchlight”, and the opportunity to fully appreciate 
the consequence of his actions lost.  Prior experience at SN109‟s gantry, combined 
with artefacts of the driver‟s training and experience are also likely to have played a 
role, as discussed in the official inquiry report (Cullen, 2000). 
 
So far we have provided details of the crash, the background to driver 
operations, the defences present in the system and the wider psychological literature 
on human error.  Combined, these provide the basis for the next stage of analysis.  
The next section presents five detailed explanations related to specific aspects of rail 
operations which contribute directly towards understanding why the driver believed 
SN109 was displaying an aspect which would have allowed him to proceed safely. 
 
Explanations for Signal SN109 Passed at Danger 
Explanation 1:  The driver misread the aspect of signal SN109. 
In the UK, railway signals communicate information about the upcoming 
route.  In the context of the Ladbroke Grove incident (and most of the UK rail 
network) this information is communicated using coloured lights.  Different signal 
aspects can be displayed (e.g. red, yellow, double yellow, green) which inform the 
driver of route occupancy, that is, how many signal-controlled sections of track ahead 
are clear of conflicting traffic/traffic arrangements.  The task of the driver is to 
combine this information with in-depth route knowledge to decide what action is 
appropriate.  For example, with certain types of rolling stock and in certain conditions 
a „double yellow‟ signal aspect requires no action from the driver at all.  In other 
circumstances, however, it could mean an immediate reduction in speed is required.  
This practice differs from many European countries which use speed-based signalling 
whereby a fixed behavioural response is required for any given signal aspect (e.g. a 
single yellow signal requires the driver to reduce speed to 40mph regardless of 
circumstances).   
The signalling regime applicable to the Ladbroke Grove incident is four aspect 
colour light signalling.  The four aspects (red, yellow, double yellow and green) are 
displayed by individual lens assemblies mounted in a common signal head.  The 
sequence of information that can be presented, and the possible interpretations by the 
driver, are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Definition of the four main signal aspects from the Master Rule Book (RS&SD, 
1999) 
Colour of signal Definition Driver interpretation  
Green Proceed  Three signalised sections of track ahead are clear 
and it is safe to maintain or accelerate to the line 
speed. 
Double yellow Proceed (but either start 
slowing down or expect 
to have to start slowing 
down at the next signal) 
Two signalised sections of track ahead are clear.  
Depending on the rolling stock and current speed, 
either begin braking or else maintain speed in 
anticipation of information conveyed by the next 
signal.  
Single yellow Proceed (but start 
slowing down in 
anticipation of having 
to stop at the next 
signal) 
Only one signalised section of track ahead is 
clear.  Continue or start to brake in order to be at 
an appropriate speed at which to stop when the 
next signal becomes visible. 
Red Stop The next signalised section of track is not clear.  
Bring the train to a complete stop in advance of 
the signal. 
 
An example of a conventional four lamp signal head is presented in Figure 2.  
Signal SN109 is also reproduced where it is important to note its unusual design, 
being shaped in the fashion of a mirrored „L‟ with the red aspect on the horizontal leg 
of the „L‟.   
  
Green
Double 
Yellow
Single 
Yellow
Red
Red
Green
Yellow 
(Double)
Yellow 
(Single)
SN109Four Aspect Signal – Conventional Design  
Figure 2 – Signal aspects for a four aspect colour light signal  
 
The Ladbroke Grove inquiry concludes that the reason why the driver believed 
he had a proceed aspect at SN109 was due to “the poor sighting of SN109, both in 
itself and in comparison with the other signals on and at gantry 8, allied to the effect 
of bright sunlight at a low angle, […] which led him to believe that he had a proceed 
aspect and so that it was appropriate for him to accelerate as he did after passing 
SN87 [the previous signal]” (Cullen, 2001, pg. 2).  Clearly, the critical human 
performance requirement for trackside signals is that they are not only visible but 
understandable.  Railway Group Standards go into extensive detail regarding signal 
sighting and conspicuity, including the oft-quoted statement that “Signals shall 
normally be positioned to give drivers an approach view for a minimum of seven 
seconds and an uninterrupted view for at least four seconds” (GK/RT 0031, 2002).  
SN109 was visible to the driver for eight seconds, even with the presence of possible 
obstructions, suggesting a number of further factors relevant to the role of signalling 
in causing the Ladbroke Grove crash.   
 
1. It is important to note that apart from signals at danger, there is no 
fixed behavioural response required of the driver in respect to the route 
signalling philosophy.  The required and appropriate behaviour 
depends on many contextual factors and on the ability of the driver to 
keep track of them.   
2. The driver‟s experience was a factor that the formal inquiry examined 
in detail.  Research has shown that drivers in their first year of driving 
were most at risk from SPADs and that between 30 and 47% of SPADs 
were accounted for by drivers with less than five years experience 
(Downes & Robinson, 1999).  The research goes on to show that the 
problems are rarely to do with failures in mastering the control of the 
train, rather, the problem lies in misinterpretation of the information 
supplied to them.  With just over a month of qualified driving 
experience the driver in question clearly fell into this „at risk‟ group.  
His training and subsequent supervision were also criticized by the 
inquiry report.   
3. The driver‟s experience of the signals on Gantry 8 (on which SN109 is 
mounted) is also important.  It was stated in the inquiry report that the 
driver had only driven trains out of Paddington 20 times.  No less than 
19 of those times the signals the driver had encountered on Gantry 8 
were showing a green/proceed aspect.  The only other occasion was 
when the driver had encountered SN109 on one previous occasion, 
three days prior to the crash, in which SN109 cleared from red to green 
as the train approached.  Therefore, on no previous occasion had the 
driver been required to stop at any of the signals mounted to Gantry 8.  
In addition, the dynamics of signal aspect presentation were such as to 
favour proceed aspects.  Phenomenon like Driving Without Attention 
Mode (DWAM; May & Gale, 1998) show that it is possible for 
expectancy of a particular signal aspect to override the external cues to 
the contrary.  
 
Whilst signal sighting and conspicuity play a key role in the immediate 
approach to SN109, inconsistencies in the driver‟s behaviour had started to occur 
before the signal was visible (i.e., when compared to a notional ideal driver who 
would have been preparing to stop the train from SN63 and SN87).  This suggests that 
the driver may have started forming his belief about the upcoming aspect of SN109 
long before sighting and conspicuity issues became a factor.  Indeed, not only was the 
driver‟s behaviour towards the previous signal (SN87) inconsistent (i.e. he did not 
begin to slow down in the manner normally expected when in receipt of the AWS 
horn and double yellow at SN63, and again at the single yellow of SN87), so was that 
of a number of other drivers who had also experienced SPADs at SN109.  When 
combined, it seems that although the proximal cause of the crash was a Signal Passed 
at Danger, the distal reason was due to a previous „Signal Passed At Caution‟. 
 
Explanation 2:  The driver mistook the position line junction 
indicator at position one for an indication that he was to be routed 
onto line one. 
Where routes diverge, the route to be taken is communicated by an attendant 
line route information display.  Two principle methods are used.  1) the driver is 
supplied with alphanumeric information (i.e. a letter or number that refers to 
particular lines the driver should take), or 2) the position line junction indicator with 
rows of lights that illuminate and point to the relevant line and/or direction the train 
should take.  These two methods provide different types of information.  The 
alphanumeric displays present the absolute route in line number(s) or letter(s) whereas 
the position line junction indicator displays the relative direction.  Illustrations and 
mappings are provided in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3 – Alpha numeric and position line indicators with accompanying mappings 
onto track layouts.   
 
There are two important differences between the position line junction 
indicator displays and the alphanumeric displays.  Firstly, no line information is 
supplied by the position line junction indicator display if the line remains unchanged, 
whereas the alphanumeric display has the potential to display the current as well as 
diverging line.  Second, the position line junction indicator display provides relative 
line routing information, whereas the alphanumeric display provides „absolute‟ 
information about the line to be taken.  The driver may encounter both types of 
indicator display on a route, as was the case at Ladbroke Grove.  As shown in Figure 
2, the driver was presented with two alphanumeric line indications, one prior to a 
change of route (after SN17) and one serving as a reminder (SN43).  This was 
followed by no line information at the next signal (SN63), because the route remained 
unchanged, followed by the position line junction indicator at position one at SN87.   
If the driver formed a belief prior to SN109 coming into view that he had a 
proceed aspect, and subsequently did not see, or else misinterpreted the position line 
indication at SN109, then it is conceivable that an expectation could be formed that 
the train would not be diverging but proceeding on the straight ahead route.  It is 
difficult to say, based on the evidence available, whether this happened or not.  The 
facts of the situation are, however, that two different methods of position line  display 
were used with the potential to cause confusion, and that the position line indicator at 
SN109 could in fact represent one of the defences in the system, albeit a rather weak 
one.  If this is the case, then it would offer a partial explanation for the driver 
selecting notch 7 (full power) on his speed controller prior to SN109.  In other words, 
the sequence of information presented to the driver may have activated schema which 
would not have prompted him to search for relevant cues in the environment.   
 
Explanation 3:  The driver forgot to apply the DRA after signal 
SN87. 
The Driver Reminder Appliance (DRA) is an additional aid to help reduce the 
likelihood of a driver starting to move past a red signal, or a so-called Starting Against 
Signal (SAS) SPAD.  Prior to performing station duties such as operation and 
monitoring of the train doors, interacting with the guard and so forth, the driver 
pushes the DRA button in the cab as a reminder that the signal ahead is red.  The 
action of pushing the button causes a prominent red light to illuminate in the cab and 
prevents power from being drawn from the engine until it has been disengaged.   
The DRA is designed to be used in stations and can only be applied after the 
driver has selected the speed control at notch zero, the neutral position.  However, it is 
possible to activate it while the train is coasting past a signal displaying caution.  It 
can also be activated during the braking manoeuvre for a red signal itself.  In both 
cases, the speed controller is in the neutral position.  Within several train operating 
companies the practice of using the DRA on-the-move had developed, and in fact was 
seen as best practice (see Cullen, 2001 pgs 65 & 78).  Indeed, the driver who passed 
SN109 was trained by one of his on-the-job mentors to apply the DRA at signals 
displaying single yellow signal aspects.  This he did consistently on the journey into 
Paddington Station on the morning of the accident, just ten minutes before the 
outward journey began.  From this it seems reasonable to suggest that the driver 
would have normally applied the DRA at single yellow signals.  Subsequent research 
into the use of DRA on the move reveals a number of problems: 
 
1. The use of the DRA is not consistently applied at every caution signal.  
This lack of consistency could lead the driver to generate false 
expectations as to what signal is ahead.  For example, if the DRA is 
usually applied at a single yellow signal, and if the driver does not 
apply the DRA at a single yellow, they may assume that the next signal 
will not be showing a red aspect.   
2. The operation of engaging the DRA could be a significant distraction 
under certain operational scenarios.  For example, the driver may have 
to attend to other in-cab warnings simultaneously, some of which are 
more safety critical than the DRA. 
3. The DRA could be set too early in the sequence, meaning that there is 
not sufficient power to get the train to the next signal.   
4. The setting and cancelling of the DRA in a succession of caution 
signals could lead the driver to get out of sequence, resetting the DRA 
rather than setting it (McCorquodale et al, 2000). 
 One explanation related to the Ladbroke Grove crash is that the driver forgot 
to apply the DRA at SN87.  This certainly seems to be the case based on the available 
OTMR data.  For drivers who used DRA „on the move‟, application of the DRA 
would be strongly associated with the train coasting, and as the train was already 
coasting in the region of SN87, the driver could have mistakenly associated this with 
the DRA having been applied.  Upon discovering that he could in fact draw power it 
may have changed his belief about the state of SN87 and the upcoming state of 
SN109: a classic mode error.  This belief could have been further modified by 
previous experience of signal aspects displayed by SN109.   
 
Explanation 4:  The driver was cancelling the Automatic 
Warning System without proper reference to the signal aspects 
triggering the system 
McLeod, Walker and Moray (2003) describe the purpose of the Automatic 
Warning System (AWS) thus: 
 
"AWS serves two functions.  The first function is to provide an audible 
alert to direct the driver's attention to an imminent event (such as a signal or a 
sign).  The second function, linked to the first, is to provide an ongoing visual 
reminder to the driver about the last warning.  [AWS] is there to help provide 
advance notice about the nature of the route ahead, and thus communicate to 
the driver the need to slow down or stop" (p.4).   
 
AWS alerts and reminders are triggered by an electro-magnetic device placed 
between the tracks approximately 200 yards prior to the signal, sign or other event to 
which it refers.  Sensors underneath the train detect the presence of a magnetic field 
and activate AWS accordingly.  AWS has two system states, but as Table 4 shows, 
multiple referents: 
 
 
Table 4 – Summary of AWS states/referents when used in connection with four aspect colour light signalling as encountered in the region of Ladbroke 
Grove 
Note: AWS warnings are also triggered for flashing double and single yellow aspects, which occur prior to a train diverging from its current route (not applicable to the 
current situation).   
STATE OF THE 
ROUTE AHEAD 
EXTERNAL VISUAL 
INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE TO THE 
DRIVER 
AWS AUDITORY 
ALERT 
AWS VISUAL 
INDICATION 
IMMEDIATE DRIVER 
ACTION 
DRIVER BEHAVIOUR 
Three signalised sections 
of track ahead are clear 
of other traffic and the 
route is configured for 
the train 
Single green signal 
aspect 
Bell or simulated chime 
at 1200 Hz 
Display shows solid 
black 
No additional action 
required 
Proceed 
Two signalised sections 
of track ahead are clear, 
but the third is occupied 
and/or not configured 
for the train 
Double yellow signal 
aspect 
Horn sound or steady 
alarm at 800 Hz 
 
Display shows black and 
yellow 
Cancel audible alarm 
and begin to slow down 
(subject to driving 
strategy, train type 
and/or other local 
circumstances) 
Proceed with caution and 
expect to slow down 
further at the next signal 
Only the next signalised 
section of track ahead is 
clear.  The one after is 
occupied and/or not 
configured for the train 
Single yellow signal 
aspect 
Cancel audible alarm.  
Start (or continue) to 
brake 
Proceed with caution and 
anticipate having to stop 
at the next signal 
The next section of track 
is occupied and/or the 
route is not configured 
for the train 
Single red signal aspect Cancel audible alarm 
and bring train to a 
complete stop 20 metres 
before signal 
Stop and wait for further 
signal aspects to be 
displayed 
AWS is a legacy system that dates back to the 1930‟s and was originally 
conceived as a means to prevent SPADS, demonstrating that SPADs do indeed have a 
long history.  Several major accidents have seen the use of AWS, and the number of 
events it now refers to, being extended.  AWS now provides warnings in six 
circumstances:  
 
1. (Certain types of) permanent speed restriction (see next section),  
2. All temporary speed restrictions,  
3. (Some) level crossings,  
4. SPAD indicators,  
5. Cancelling boards,  
6. And other locations (such as unsuppressed track magnets, depot test 
magnets etc.).   
 
Unfortunately, the simple two state warning (bell/horn) and visual reminder (a 
black/yellow disc) are unable to discriminate between these six different events.  The 
confusion that this could cause for drivers was cited in the Ladbroke Grove inquiry 
report (Cullen, 2001).   
An unwanted AWS brake demand is a highly inconvenient event so there is 
great incentive to cancel AWS warnings quickly.  This combines with (a) the 
visibility of the AWS equipment mounted on the track, (b) the driver‟s high level of 
route knowledge and (c) the predictive manner in which trains must be driven, to 
explain the extremely quick „reaction times‟ drivers exhibit in response to AWS 
warnings.  Walker and McLeod (2003) provide some insight into this based on a 
small random sample of OTMR data.  It was observed that the mean reaction time to 
an AWS warning (the time taken between the horn being activated and the 
cancellation button being pressed) is just 0.6 seconds (min = 0.49, max = 0.89).  This 
response is so fast that the term „reaction time‟ may not be entirely appropriate.  
Rather than „reacting‟, drivers seem to be „pro-acting‟.  In-cab observations of drivers 
show them to be covering the AWS button with their hand in expectation of an AWS 
warning.  OTMR data also shows numerous occasions where driver‟s cancelled the 
AWS horn before it had even started to sound (suggestive of the driver pressing the 
button a number of times on the approach to the on-track AWS equipment, which is 
clearly visible from the train cab).  The frequency of AWS events in the Paddington 
and Ladbroke Grove area would be compatible with this behaviour, with four AWS 
events occurring in the space of 2.5 miles or just three minutes.   
The actions following an AWS warning are of further interest.  In McLeod, 
Walker and Moray‟s sample of OTMR data there were 21 AWS warnings.  Three of 
those events were followed by the brake being applied but a greater number (5) were 
followed (quite appropriately for the circumstances) by the train being accelerated.  
There is, therefore; “no single, fixed behavioural response expected of a driver when 
in receipt of an AWS warning.  Many factors specific to the driver, the class of rolling 
stock involved, the nature of the movement, and the situation at the time the warning 
occurs will determine how and when an individual driver reacts” (2003, p.9).  The 
task of the driver, therefore, is to keep track of these factors and reach a safe and 
effective decision based on them.   
On the morning of the Ladbroke Grove crash, the first signal which required 
the driver of IK20 to respond to an AWS warning was SN63.  The reaction time 
between hearing the warning and pressing the AWS cancel button was 1.15 seconds.  
At the next signal, SN87, this reaction time shortened by 0.5 seconds to 0.65 seconds.  
The same fast reaction time occurred in respect to the AWS warning at the final signal 
at danger, SN109.  In both cases, 650ms is an extremely fast response.  It is 
suggestive of the action being performed in a predictive, feed-forward manner.  What 
this response time data seems to show is a switch from deliberate feedback control 
(i.e. perceive – decide – act) to predictive feed forward control (i.e. decide – 
perceive/act) between SN63 and SN109.   
 
Explanation 5:  The driver mistook the cause of the AWS 
activation prior to signal SN109 for a triangular speed restriction. 
As a train leaves Paddington Station the line speed is initially set at 25 mph 
and a reminder of this speed restriction is placed close to the starting signal SN17, the 
first signal the driver will pass on leaving platform nine.  Subsequent speed restriction 
signs allow the driver to gradually increase their speed as they move further down the 
line.  There were five trackside speed restriction signs applicable to IK20‟s route, and 
a further five applicable to adjacent tracks.  Various group standards define where, 
and the manner in which, speed limits should be posted.  Warning signs are 
sometimes provided in advance of speed restriction signs (warning indicators are 
triangular with a yellow border whereas permanent speed limits are posted with a 
round sign and red border).  AWS is attributed to warning indicators “where the 
permissible speed on the approach is 60mph or greater and the required reduction in 
speed is one third or more of that permissible speed [..]”. (GK/RT0038, 2000 p.14).  
Although this is the case at around 1000 sites on the UK rail network (e.g. Walker & 
McLeod, 2003) this was not the case in the vicinity of SN109 even though a warning 
indicator was placed under the bridge before signal SN109.   
It is possible that from the driver‟s position in the cab that upon cancelling the 
AWS he saw the triangular speed restriction under the bridge in front of signal SN109 
and took that as the AWS trigger, rather than the signal gantry.  If the driver thought 
that the reason for the AWS was the triangular speed restriction he may not have 
searched any further for possible triggers. 
 
Critical Path Analysis 
The explanations above describe a discrete set of events which individually, 
and combined, could have played a role in the driver believing he could proceed past 
signal SN109 despite it showing a red aspect.  In this section, multi-model critical 
path analysis will be used to map these discrete events onto the accident timeline, and 
from this, attempt to draw some conclusions about why the driver behaved as he did.   
Critical Path Analysis (CPA) is a planning technique used to estimate the 
duration of projects in which some tasks can be performed in parallel.  The 
assumption is that a given task cannot start until all preceding tasks that contribute to 
it are complete.  This means that some tasks might be completed and the process is 
waiting for other tasks before it is possible to proceed.  The tasks which are completed 
but waiting for others are said to be „floating‟, i.e., they can shift their start times with 
little impact on the overall process.  Tasks that the others wait for are said to lie on the 
critical path, and any change to these tasks will have an impact on the overall process 
time.  It is possible to apply these ideas to any time-based activity, including human 
performance and the situation at Ladbroke Grove. 
As a method of modelling human performance, CPA is based on the idea that 
if two or more tasks occupied the same modality they must be performed in series, but 
if they occupied different modalities they may be performed in parallel (Olsen & 
Olsen, 1990; Baber & Mellor, 2001).  The allocation of tasks to modalities is shown 
in Table 5, along with generic task timings derived from the Key-Stroke-Level 
Method (KLM) and similar literature (Graham, 1999; Baber & Mellor, 2001; Olsen & 
Olsen; 1990). 
 
Table 5 – Allocation of tasks to modalities 
Modalities Tasks Timing Source 
Central processing Identify intervention strategy   
Visual  Look at track 
Identify signal 
Identify button 
 
340ms 
 
Baber & Mellor, 2001 
Auditory Hear warning 300ms Graham, 1999 
Manual Reach for button 
Press button 
320ms 
230ms 
Baber & Mellor, 2001 
Olsen & Olsen, 1990 
 
The tasks are put into the order of occurrence, checking the logic for parallel 
and serial tasks.  For serial tasks, the logical sequence is determined by a task 
analysis.  For parallel tasks, the sensory modality determines their placement in the 
representation.  To make the CPA easier to view, tasks of the same modality are 
always positioned in the same row in the diagram.  The time that the task may be 
performed can be found by tracing through the CPA using the longest node-to-node 
values.  Figure 4 shows the CPA model for the driver's responses to the AWS at 
signal SN63 compared to signals SN87 and SN109, where a switch from feedback to 
feed forward control is visually apparent.   
 
 Figure 7.  Critical path analysis for signal SN63 (top) and signals SN87 and 109 (bottom)
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Figure 4 – Critical path analysis of driver responses to AWS at SN63 (top) and 
SN87/SN109 (bottom) where a change of cognitive mode is visually apparent   
 
The CPA diagram is constructed from the known facts of the journey as 
described above, with detailed timings and sequences of action provided from the on-
train monitoring and recording equipment.  This analysis shows a total activity time of 
1.2 seconds for signal SN63, which is very close indeed to the actual response time of 
1.15 seconds.  Likewise, a total activity time of 0.64 seconds is found for the response 
time to signals SN87 and SN109, virtually identical once more to the observed times.  
(Total activity times are based on tracing the path of the longest response times 
through Figure 4).  Figure 4 shows that the driver‟s first response to SN109, after 
cancelling the AWS horn, was to increase speed.  It is estimated that from the first 
presentation of the AWS horn the driver would have been engaged in the tasks of 
identifying the AWS trigger (i.e., mistakenly identifying the triangular speed 
restriction) then focusing in the cab to increase the speed, then confirming that speed 
was increasing.  If the driver was expecting to cross over to the down main or down 
relief lines, he may well have been focusing on the line for the points leading to the 
crossover.   
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Figure 5 – Error types mapped on to the critical path analysis of activities in the region 
of SN109 
 
The preceding sections have provided a detailed account of the situation, 
context and plausible explanations based on these and the psychological literature.  
From this it becomes possible to extend the critical path analysis presented in Figure 5 
further back in time to show what error conditions become active prior to SN109, 
when they become active, and how they combine to defeat the last defence in the 
system (i.e. signal SN109).  From Figure 5 it can be argued that a combination of a 
loss-of-activation (i.e. the failure to use the DRA after passing signal SN87 leading 
the driver to forget its aspect) created the conditions for a mode error (i.e. the 
realisation that power could be drawn and a consequent change in expectation as to 
future events) coupled with a data-driven-activation error (i.e. interpreting the AWS 
activation trigger as the triangular speed restriction sign under the bridge before signal 
SN109).  These conditions would be sufficient to cause the driver to proceed past 
SN109 even though it was showing danger.  Moreover, this sequence of events fits the 
timeline of actual events and would render such behaviour as „locally rational‟ on the 
part of the driver.   
 
Conclusions 
Despite the Ladbroke Grove accident taking place over ten years ago, and 
despite a wide range of interventions and changes to the industry as a direct result, 
SPADs still occur.  Ladbroke Grove is now something of a classic case study, yet 
regardless of a seemingly exhaustive and in-depth analysis, the inquiry itself was not 
able to reach a definitive answer as to why the driver in question believed he could 
proceed past SN109 despite it showing danger.  The inquiry recognised this as an 
open question with its 19th formal recommendation (out of 89) being:  “Further 
research should be carried out to develop the understanding of human factors as they 
relate to train driving” (Cullen, 2000, p. 229).   
The simplest answer as to why the driver in question passed SN109 at danger 
is that he simply misread the aspect.  As such, the issue becomes one of signal 
sighting and conspicuity, an issue which rightly informs many human factors and 
engineering interventions.  But this simplistic answer is unsatisfactory in this case.  
The clue to deeper, more psychologically orientated factors lies not only in the fact 
that many SPADs occur in conditions of perfect sighting and conspicuity, but in this 
case, that a number of subtle behaviour changes were detected well in advance of the 
signal passed at danger.  To probe these deeper issues this paper considers the actions 
of the driver, the behaviour of the train, the technology used, the context of rail 
operations, and the underpinning psychological and technological issues.  Compatible 
with Lawton and Ward‟s previous work in this area we take a broader systems view 
but this time we take that view in conjunction with the literature on human error, 
distributed and situated cognition.  Via this approach it is possible to arrive at a 
specific multi-causal explanation of why the driver in question passed signal SN109 at 
danger and, moreover, why it may have made sense to him to do so in those 
circumstances.  It is proposed that the following error types could have combined to 
create a form of local rationality for the driver: a combination of loss-of-activation 
(i.e. the failure to use the DRA after passing signal SN87 ultimately led the driver to 
forgetting its aspect) created the conditions for a mode error (i.e. the realisation that 
power could be drawn and a consequent change in expectation as to future events) 
coupled with a data-driven-activation error (i.e. attributing the AWS activation trigger 
to the triangular speed restriction sign under the bridge before signal SN109).  Taken 
together, these factors offer a plausible explanation for a seemingly implausible set of 
behaviours.   
The next question, simply stated, is what can be done.  There are several 
aspects of system design relevant to reducing the likelihood of these errors, many of 
which have already been actioned as a result of Ladbroke Grove.  This includes 
eliminating the use of DRA on-the-move, integrating the line-side signals into the 
drivers‟ cab interfaces, and separating the warning sounds and visual indicators for 
different stimuli.  Following the accident, the use of DRA on-the-move was indeed 
halted (McCorquodale et al, 2002).  The rail industry‟s long term ambition to place 
signals in the cab, and provide better discrimination between warnings, is subsumed 
under the European Rail Traffic Management (ERTMS) system.  These outcomes are 
consistent with the current findings as well as those of the official inquiry and in 
themselves are not especially novel.   
Whilst specific error types can be attributed to specific items of infrastructure, 
and that infrastructure changed in order to prevent those errors occurring, it is evident 
from this work that such a deterministic approach may still leave gaps in system 
defences.  What the present findings show, above all, is how errors combine over 
time, multiply rather than add together, and emerge in forms that are not only 
extremely difficult to predict but which cause a form of local rationality for those on 
the operational front line, preventing them from providing significant insight into their 
own behaviour.  So whilst the present paper provides support for the many 
interventions that have flowed from the Ladbroke Grove crash it is possible to go 
further. 
The problem with high reliability transport modes, such as rail, is that quite 
often major accidents occur and interventions are put in place that are not necessarily 
well evolved to the situation they are being placed in.  Evolution requires time 
whereas accident investigations require decisive action, and usually a deterministic 
approach to the management of errors.  This is clearly evident in several important 
aspects of rail operations.  For example, the problem of the simple two state AWS 
system with multiple warning referents arises from previous accident investigations 
which recommended the use of AWS being extended beyond its original design.  A 
further irony is that a system designed to overcome certain types of SPAD, the DRA, 
may have played a part in causing the SPAD at Ladbroke Grove.  The use of lagging 
indicators to inform the design of infrastructure, therefore, tends to deal with „known 
unknowns‟ simply because they have revealed themselves in the course of a major 
incident.  The real challenge for high reliability transport domains lies elsewhere, in 
the extended pre-accident timeline and the conditions which exist in the system which 
enable as yet unknown error types to emerge in the future.   
This paper supports the concept of Train Data Monitoring.  Instead of using 
the data which informed the inquiry and analysis into Ladbroke Grove „after the 
event‟, an opportunity now exists (with on train monitoring and recording now 
mandatory) to use it „before the event‟.  That is, to use it in a manner similar to the 
mature Flight Data Monitoring programmes within the aviation industry, whereby 
data on routine journeys is collected and assembled into a central source (CAA, 
2008).  By these means, very subtle out of specification events of the sort discussed in 
this paper can be detected before they manifest themselves as a serious safety 
concern.  Furthermore, it has become apparent through this paper that it is eminently 
possible to drive human factors methods such as CPA using this type of data.  For 
example, it would be possible to identify particular locations where sequences of 
actions deviate from accepted good practice.  It would also be possible to identify 
changes in mode, from feedback to feed forward control using aggregated industry 
data on reaction times.  This data could then be used to inform engineering, training 
and/or procedural interventions which, in turn, could be monitored to test their effect.  
In conclusion, the work presented in this paper motivates an ongoing programme of 
research into the concept of Rail Data Monitoring and the ability to use on train 
monitoring and recording outputs to drive human factors methods.   
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Abstract 
Ten years after the event and the question as to exactly why a driver passed a 
signal at danger to cause the Ladbroke Grove rail disaster is still an open one.  This 
paper uses the literature on human error and cognition, combined with critical path 
analysis, to provide further insight.  Five aspects of train operation are drawn out of 
the known facts surrounding the incident: custom and practice in the use of the 
Driver‟s Reminder Appliance, operation and use of the Automatic Warning System, 
the sequence of signalling information, methods of supplying route information, and 
speed restrictions.  Associated with each are several important human factors issues 
which, combined, give rise to five potential explanations.  Critical path analysis is 
used to map these explanations onto the known facts of the situation.  It is suggested 
that the proximal cause of the Ladbroke Grove rail crash was a combination of an 
association-activation error and a mode error (leading the driver to mistakenly assume 
*Manuscript
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he had activated the Reminder Appliance) together with a loss-of-activation error (the 
driver failing to remember that a previous signal was showing caution) and a data-
driven-activation error (by associating an in-cab warning to the wrong external 
source).  The findings support the original inquiry recommendations, but also go 
further into predictive methods of detecting problems at the human/transport system 
interface.  
Keywords:  SPAD; Schema; Error; Event Analysis; Critical Path Analysis 
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Introduction 
Ladbroke Grove has become shorthand for Lord Cullen‟s inquiry report whose 
recommendations had a wide ranging impact on the UK railway industry.  Ladbroke 
Grove itself is a suburban district located in West London through which the London 
to West Country main line runs.  It is approximately two miles from the line's 
terminus, London Paddington.  It was at this location, at 08:09 on the 5th October 
1999, that an outbound three car commuter train collided with an eight coach high 
speed train at a combined speed of 130mph, injuring over 400 people and causing the 
deaths of 31, including both drivers.  Although accidents like this are extremely rare 
on the UK rail network, this incident was the result of a long-standing human factors 
problem – a Signal Passed At Danger (SPAD).   
A SPAD is when a train driver passes a signal displaying a stop aspect.  To the 
outside observer, problems like this appear deeply perplexing.  How is it possible that 
a driver can acknowledge up to three in cab warnings, override three automatic 
applications of the emergency brake, but still proceed past a point at which he or she 
is required to stop?  Within the scientific community, and despite a considerable body 
of research, this category of problem is far from fully resolved: SPADs have occurred 
for well over a hundred years and still occur to this day, with many examples 
remaining stubbornly resistant to a wide range of well intentioned safety measures.  
SPADs are more than specific incidents, they also represent a perplexing „category‟ of 
human factors problem, a category that is to be found in virtually all transport 
domains.  Road transport, for example, has „unintended acceleration‟ (e.g. Schmidt, 
1989) and „highway hypnosis‟ (e.g. May & Gale, 1998).  Aviation has „controlled 
flight into terrain‟ (e.g. Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003), „mode errors‟ (e.g. Endsley & 
Kiris, 1995) and „automation surprises‟ (e.g. Sarter & Woods, 1997).  What all these 
cases share in common are functioning safety systems which are defeated or ignored, 
leading to perfectly serviceable vehicles being placed in highly dangerous conditions.   
The problem with SPADs (and SPAD-like phenomenon) is that they appear 
both paradoxical yet simple.  After all, the task of the driver is to spot a signal 
displaying a stop indication and apply the brakes.  But this apparent simplicity is 
misleading.  In the case of the Ladbroke Grove rail crash a clue to the presence of 
deeper, more psychological issues is revealed by the fact that the inquiry team had no 
doubt that the driver believed he had a proceed aspect showing at the last signal he 
passed.  The report, furthermore, alludes to the fact that “SN109 [the code given to the 
signal that was passed at danger] was a multi-SPAD signal” (Cullen, 2001, pg 2) 
meaning that the driver in question was not alone in passing this particular signal at 
danger. 
Although the Ladbroke Grove accident happened ten years ago SPADs still 
occur.   An opportunity exists to re-visit Ladbroke Grove and go beyond the official 
enquiry report into the misleadingly simple question of „why‟ the driver in question 
passed a signal he was not meant to.  The inquiry report invites such analysis.  In the 
words of Lord Cullen, the inquiry chairman, “...it is not possible for me to arrive at a 
full explanation of [the driver‟s] actions” (Cullen, 2001, para 5.111, p. 80).  The 
question of specifically „why‟ the driver passed the signal is therefore an open one.   
Several authors have responded to this opportunity previously and have used 
the great depth of information provided by the formal investigation to try and go 
further.  Lawton and Ward (2005) and Santos-Reyes and Beard (2006) both adopt a 
systems approach, shifting the level of analysis to encompass the combined effects of 
the operational and organisational environment.  Both conclude, quite rightly, that 
train crashes like this cannot be distilled into a single causal factor and that a systemic 
failure took place which enabled direct, indirect, latent and active factors to propagate 
through the interacting system elements.  A paper by Evans (2005) presents an 
interesting counterpoint.  Despite the severity of the Ladbroke Grove accident, and the 
public perceptions which surrounded it, rail safety continued its improving trend 
regardless.  This brings into sharp relief a particular facet of SPADs as a category of 
human factors problem; their low probability but extremely high cost.   
This unfortunate probability/cost trade-off, requires a particularly fine grained 
analysis.  The present paper aims to make a contribution of this sort by shifting the 
systemic level of analysis closer to the accident itself.  It does this by looking at the 
interacting psychological mechanisms underpinning the actions and behaviour of the 
driver who committed the SPAD.  The paper combines the known facts of the 
Ladbroke Grove incident with the latest knowledge of human factors in order to 
develop a number of plausible explanations for the accident, which can then be 
evaluated.  This probing is intended to go further than the inquiry report and respond 
to the tacit invitation therein: simply, why did the driver believe SN109 was 
displaying a proceed aspect?  Given that a similar class of problem occurs in most 
other high reliability domains, additional insight into the underlying psychological 
mechanisms is as valuable as it is transferrable.  The remainder of the introduction 
deals with the events leading up to the crash and wider aspects of rail operations 
which have a bearing on understanding its cause.    
 
Timeline of Events 
In order to understand the situation and context surrounding the Ladbroke 
Grove rail accident it is necessary to re-play the train journey in question.   
It is 08:05 on the 5
th
 October 1999.  A „Thames Turbo‟ multiple unit 
commuter train, identifying number 1K20, is waiting on platform 9 of London‟s 
Paddington station.  On board are the driver and 147 passengers.   
At 08:06 the On-Train Monitoring and Recording (OTMR) equipment and 
records from the computerised signalling centre show that the train passed the signal 
(code number SN17) at the end of the platform.  SN17 was showing a green aspect 
(proceed) and an illuminated number four (indicating that the train would be routed to 
line four).  So called „starting signals‟ at the ends of platforms in terminus stations 
like Paddington do not have the Automatic Warning System (AWS) fitted to them, 
thus no audible or visual indication of SN17‟s signal aspect would be provided in the 
cab.   
Between SN17 and SN43 (the next signal in sequence) the driver gradually 
increased speed to 34 mph.  He did this by moving the speed control successively up 
through seven speed notches in the following order: 1, 2, 3, 4, 7.  Two speed 
restriction signs were passed, one reading 40mph and later one reading 60mph.   
The next signal, code number SN43, was showing a green aspect (proceed) 
and an illuminated number four, indicating that the train would be continuing along 
line four.  200 yards from SN43 the Automatic Warning System (AWS) triggered an 
audible „chime‟ in the cab, confirming to the driver that SN43 was showing a proceed 
aspect and that he need not perform any actions additional to those already being 
performed.  From this point, speed increased further to 44 mph. 
The next signal had the code number SN63 and it was showing a double 
yellow aspect.  This means „preliminary caution‟ and that two signalised sections of 
track ahead are clear but that the third is occupied.  This signal was not presenting any 
route information meaning that the driver could assume he was staying on the same 
track.  Approximately 200 yards before the signal, the AWS triggered a horn sound in 
the cab and gave the driver six seconds to press the AWS cancel button in order to 
prevent an automatic application of the train‟s brakes.  The driver correctly pressed 
the button causing the horn sound to stop and the in-cab AWS display to change 
colour.  The display now provided an ongoing reminder that the last AWS activation 
was a warning.  Shortly after SN63, the driver put the speed control in the neutral 
position and applied the brake at level one for about seven seconds, enough to reduce 
speed from 44 to 39 mph as it approached the next signal in sequence, SN87. 
SN87 was displaying a single yellow aspect meaning „caution‟, only the next 
signalised section of track is clear and that the next signal is likely to be at danger.  
Route information was also being displayed on an associated „position light junction 
indicator‟ where a row of white coloured lights was pointing left.  This informed the 
driver that the train was going to be routed onto the adjacent left-hand line after the 
next signal.  Again, 200 yards from SN87 the AWS horn sounded in the cab and a 
request for an automatic application of the brakes was cancelled.  The in-cab AWS 
display remained in its previous state and provided an ongoing reminder of the last 
AWS indication received (i.e. a warning).  At this point, it would have been normal 
practice for the driver to start slowing down in order to stop in advance of the next 
signal.  In this case, however, the train continued to coast for another 30 seconds.   
The next signal, SN109, was displaying a red aspect meaning stop.  
Approximately 200 yards before SN109 the train passed over the associated 
Automatic Warning System (AWS) equipment on the track.  A warning horn was 
received in the cab and a request for an automatic brake application was once again 
cancelled.  The in-cab AWS display remained in the state that had been triggered by 
SN43 (two signals previously) and the driver moved the speed controller from notch 
zero (coasting) to notch 5.  This kept the train cruising at around 38mph.   
Just ahead of SN109 were two speed restriction signs located at the trackside.  
The first was a round sign warning of an 85mph restriction, the second was a 
triangular warning sign referring to a 70mph restriction on the crossover to the right.  
Concurrent with the signs, the driver moved the speed controller from notch five to 
notch seven (maximum).  The train accelerated past SN109 at danger, the only in-cab 
warning for this event having been cancelled by the driver approximately two seconds 
previously.  The only alarms raised as the train entered a section of track it was not 
meant to were those in the remote signalling centre 15 miles away in Slough.  The 
signaller in charge of monitoring the situation made an attempt to halt an approaching 
train by turning a signal with the code number SN120 from green (proceed) to red 
(stop).  The driver of the train travelling in the opposite direction, a high speed train 
comprised of eight coaches with a power-car at each end, immediately applied the 
brakes. 
Thirty six seconds after selecting speed control notch seven, with the Thames 
Turbo‟s speed now approaching 50mph, the On-Train Monitoring and Recording 
(OTMR) equipment showed that the driver moved the control from notch seven 
straight to notch zero (the neutral position) followed immediately by an application of 
the emergency brake.   
Five seconds later the Thames Turbo collided with the High Speed Train near 
to signal SN120.  The combined speed of impact was 130mph. 
The events and surrounding context have been assembled into Figure 1 which 
is based on data from the On-Train Monitoring and Recording (OTMR) equipment 
and the known layout of the rail infrastructure. 
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Figure 1 – Schematic of Ladbroke Grove event timeline 
Defences in Depth 
The railway system, like all safety-critical systems, has multiple layers of 
defences each with the potential to prevent an accident (Reason, 1990, 1988).  
Multiple defences have the benefit that should any one defence fail, there will be 
other defences in place to prevent anything untoward occurring.  Reason argues that 
in reality these defences tend to interact dynamically with local demands and human 
error.  As shown in Table 1, there were at least seven such defences in place on the 
day of the incident, with the driver managing to defeat the last five.  Specifically, had 
the driver not selected the speed control notch 5, or had applied the DRA after SN87, 
or correctly identified the automatic warning at SN109, or not selected the speed 
control notch 7, it is probable that the accident either would not have occurred or not 
been as devastating as it was.   
 
Table 1 – Analysis of defences in depth 
Defences-in-depth Driver response Train response 
1.  SN63 AWS horn Cancel AWS AWS horn cancelled 
2.  SN63 at double yellow Select speed control notch 0 
and brake level 1 applied and 
released 
Train coasting at 45mph then 
braking to 41mph and 
coasting to 39mph  
3.  SN87 AWS horn Cancel AWS AWS horn cancelled 
4.  SN87 at single yellow Allow train to continue 
coasting for 30 seconds, then 
select speed control notch 5 
Train coasting at 39mph then 
cruising at 38mph 
5.  Driver Reminder  
Appliance 
Not applied Train coasting but driver is 
still able to draw power 
6.  SN109 AWS horn Cancel AWS 
Select speed control notch 7 
AWS horn cancelled 
Train accelerating from 
38mph to 50mph 
7.  SN109 at red No response Train accelerating from 
38mph to 50mph 
 
 
The Ladbroke Grove accident clearly follows a trajectory through each layer 
of defence which, for a host of interacting local and global reasons, had aligned in 
such a way as to permit the crash to take place.  The multiple defences in the system 
offer an explanation as to why these events are so rare and why problems like SPADS 
appear, on the surface, to be so unique and perplexing.   
 
Background to Driver Operations 
At first sight, it seems inconceivable that a driver can acknowledge the receipt 
of no less than three warnings, each one requiring the cancellation of an automatic 
emergency brake request, yet still fail to stop at a red signal.  But as numerous studies 
have shown, it does happen (e.g. Hall, 1999; Andersen, 1999; Williams, 1977; Van 
der Flier & Schoonman, 1988; Gilchrist, 1990; Gibson, 1999; Downes & Robinson, 
1999; May, Horberry & Gale, 1996; Wright, Ross & Davies, 2000; Hill, 1995).  All of 
these sources allude to the broader context of train driving operations as an 
explanation for the counter-intuitive nature of SPADS, a context which can now be 
explored in more detail.   
 
We begin with a lay-man‟s description of train driving provided by a driver in 
a focus group: 
 
“The best way to describe [driving a train] is a bit like having to drive your 
car on ice – at 100 mph – with only the handbrake to slow you down.” (McLeod, 
Walker & Moray, 2003: 2005).   
 
It takes approximately two miles for a train travelling at 125mph to be brought 
to a complete halt.  As a result, it is comparatively rare for a driver to begin braking 
from high speed for an event that can, at that moment, be clearly seen ahead.  Rather 
like pilots who make extensive use of their instruments, train drivers rely heavily on 
information conveyed to them by line-side signals.  This combines with in-depth route 
knowledge to generate a response (like braking or acceleration) which is appropriate 
for the circumstances.  What this means is that the kind of feedback control 
encountered in car driving, where a driver will see a red traffic light and apply the 
brakes in order to stop before it, does not often apply.  Neither do the simple Input 
(i.e. red traffic light) –Processing (i.e. what is the braking distance) -Output (i.e. apply 
the brakes) models of cognition frequently encountered in human factors apply 
particularly well to SPADs.  This is because „the input‟ is derived indirectly and 
constructed from an expectation of what is ahead.  Train driving is characterized by 
large amounts of this predictive, feed-forward control, with drivers being actively 
required to believe that certain system states are imminent based on what they know 
currently:  they could not control a train at speed otherwise.  The key in railway 
operations is to ensure those beliefs and predictions, and the corresponding 
behaviours, are correct.  Put simply, because drivers have to prepare to stop for up to 
two miles, and several signals in advance, the problem becomes less to do with 
signals being passed at danger and more to do with other events, principally the 
succession of previous signals passed at caution.   
 
Psychological Mechanisms in Error Production 
In order to relate train driving operations to the system defences that were 
defeated in the run up to the Ladbroke Grove crash, it is necessary to consult the 
psychological literature on human error, working memory and attention.   
 
Interactive Schemata 
Norman (1981) reports research on the categorisation of action slips based on 
an analysis of 1,000 incidents.  Underpinning the analysis was a psychological theory 
of schema activation.  He argued that action sequences are triggered by knowledge 
structures organised as memory units and called schemas.  The mind comprises a 
hierarchy of schemas that are invoked (or triggered) if particular conditions are 
satisfied or events occur.  Related to this is Neisser‟s (1976) seminal work on 
„Cognition and Reality‟, where he puts forward a view of how human thought is 
closely coupled with a person‟s interaction with the world.  He argues that knowledge 
of how the world works (e.g. schemas) leads to certain kinds of information being 
expected, which in turn directs behaviour to seek it out and provide a ready means of 
interpreting the situation.  During the course of events, as the environment is sampled, 
the information serves to update and modify the internal cognitive schema of the 
world, which will again direct further search.   
The perceptual cycle can be used to explain human information processing in 
train driving.  Assuming that the individual has the correct route knowledge for 
operating the train, their schema will enable them to anticipate events (such as the 
signals and signs they expect to see and routes they expect to take), search for 
confirmatory evidence (such as looking at the signal aspect, trackside objects, routing 
information, speed indicators and notes), direct a course of action (such as braking 
and accelerating) and continually check that the outcome is as expected (such as the 
slowing down or the speeding up of the train).  If they uncover some data they do not 
expect (such as an unexpected warning or track routing) they are required to source a 
wider knowledge of the world to consider possible explanations that will direct future 
search activities.  The completeness of this model is in the description of process (the 
cyclical nature of sampling the world) and product (the updating of the world model 
at any point in time).   
 
Error Taxonomy 
The interactive schema model works well for explaining how we act in the 
world and what can go wrong.  As Norman's (1981) research shows, it may also 
explain why errors occur as they do.   If, as schema theory predicts, action is directed 
by schemata, then faulty schemata, or faulty activation, will lead to erroneous 
performance.  As Table 2 shows, this can occur in at least three main ways.  First, we 
can select the wrong schema due to misinterpretation of the situation.  Second, we can 
activate the wrong schema because of similarities in the trigger conditions.  Third, we 
can activate schemas too early or too late.   
 Table 2 - Taxonomy of errors with examples 
Taxonomy of errors Examples of error types 
Errors that result from the 
formation of intention 
Mode errors: erroneous classification of the situation 
Description errors: ambiguous or incomplete specification of 
intention 
Errors that result from faulty 
activation of schemas 
Loss-of-activation errors: schemas that lose activation after they 
have been activated  
Data-driven-activation errors: external events that cause the 
activation of schemas 
Association-activation errors: currently active schemas that activate 
other schemas with which they are associated 
Capture errors: similar sequences of action, where stronger 
sequence takes control 
Errors that result from faulty 
triggering of active schemas 
Blend errors: combination of components from competing schemas 
Premature activation errors: schemas that are activated too early 
Failure to activate errors: failure of the trigger condition or event to 
activate the schema 
 
Reference to the known facts of the Ladbroke Grove crash described above, 
and to the error types shown in Table 2, shows only weak evidence for a description 
error, association-activation error, capture errors or blend/premature/failure to activate 
errors.  The driver demonstrated no apparent ambiguity in his intention and made no 
attempt to correct his actions.  This, in turn, supports a view that the actions being 
performed were consistent with individual schemas.  The known facts (particularly 
the OTMR data) also support the view that actions were carried out in response to, 
and apparently triggered by, external stimuli.  What the known facts do communicate, 
however, is stronger evidence for a loss-of-activation error, followed by a mode error, 
followed again by a data-driven-activation error.  These error types also fit the 
timeline of events well: for example, the driver fails to remember that he has passed a 
single yellow at SN87, perhaps confuses the coasting of the train with application of 
the DRA and then, possibly, mistakes the speed restriction as the cause of the 
activation of SN109‟s in-cab automatic warning.  Specific explanations will be 
developed shortly, for the time being it seems reasonable to suspend further 
consideration of the former error types (description, association-activation, capture, 
blend, premature, failure to activate) in favour of the latter three (loss of activation, 
mode and data-driven).  These are taken forward in the next sections. 
 
Loss of Activation Error 
There are two main ways in which information is lost from working memory: 
displacement and decay.  In displacement, older information is displaced from 
working memory by newer information.  Working memory has upper limits on 
capacity of (see Miller‟s classic 1956 work).  This means that as the journey 
progresses, information about signals and signs passed will be displaced by more 
recent signs and signals.  In decay, information is forgotten as time elapses.  The more 
information held in working memory the faster it decays.  Individual chunks (such as 
remembering a single yellow aspect at a previous signal) have a half-life in working 
memory of approximately 70 seconds (the delay after which recall is reduced by one 
half: see Card, Moran & Newell, 1986).  Whilst this is well within the actual time 
taken by the driver to travel from SN87 to SN109 (the journey took approximately 30 
seconds) the half-life is reduced by a factor of ten when the numbers of chunks are 
tripled (such as remembering route information and speed restrictions in addition to 
remembering a single yellow aspect at the signal just passed).  The loss of information 
from working memory is thus plausible in these circumstances. 
 
 
Mode Error 
Norman (1981) singles out mode errors as requiring special attention in the 
design of technological systems.  He pointed out that the misclassification of the 
mode that the system was in could lead to input errors which may have serious 
effects.  Woods et al (1994) state that mode errors occur when there is a breakdown in 
situation assessment.  They argue that keeping track of the mode that a system is in 
increases the demands placed on memory and situation assessment.  In the present 
case, the loss of activation error seems to have compounded the problem by giving the 
driver a mistaken belief as to the current mode.  The selection of notch 5 on the speed 
control just before SN109 is consistent with a mode error, and the driver‟s mistaken 
belief that he had not passed a previous signal displaying caution and therefore would 
not be expecting to see a signal displaying danger.   
 
Data Driven Activation Error 
The third error, the attribution of an in-cab warning at referring to SN109 
incorrectly to a nearby speed restriction sign, is consistent with the driver‟s almost 
immediate selection of speed control notch 7 (the data-driven-activation error).  The 
concept of limited pools of attentional resources (Wickens, 1992) is relevant here.  
The basic premise is that allocation of attentional resources to one task will result in 
fewer resources available for another.  For example, attentional resources focused on 
detecting hazards or checking the line ahead for crossovers will mean that there are 
fewer resources available for determining alternative courses of action and executing 
manual responses.   
Attention has often been described using the metaphor of a searchlight 
(Barber, 1988).  The direction of the driver‟s attention is like the beam of the 
searchlight and everything that falls within the beam of the searchlight is processed.  
The limits of human attention can cause problems in the train driving task in cases 
where the driver is required to focus on some stimuli rather than others, is distracted 
and/or too thinly divided across too many concurrent tasks.  There are two main 
factors to be considered: attentional resources and direction of visual focus.  These 
factors offer an explanation for the demands placed upon the driver at SN109.  On 
hearing and cancelling the in-cab warning referring to SN109‟s signal aspect (i.e. red) 
the driver‟s visual attention may have focused on the speed restriction sign below the 
bridge.  The information perceived and processed within the attentional “searchlight” 
is highly detailed, whilst the surrounding information tends to be perceived and 
processed in a peripheral manner.  Whilst the driver may have been very aware of the 
speed restriction signs, he may only have been vaguely aware of the overhead lines 
and signal gantry.  Of course, this goes against all driver training and common 
experience to the point of implausibility.  Yet, after cancelling the AWS the driver 
behaved in a way consistent with this by selecting speed control notch 7.  To do this 
he may have switched his attention to the controls and speed indicator inside the cab.  
By the time his attention was focused back on the line the gantry at SN109 might not 
have been within the attentional “searchlight”, and the opportunity to fully appreciate 
the consequence of his actions lost.  Prior experience at SN109‟s gantry, combined 
with artefacts of the driver‟s training and experience are also likely to have played a 
role, as discussed in the official inquiry report (Cullen, 2000). 
 
So far we have provided details of the crash, the background to driver 
operations, the defences present in the system and the wider psychological literature 
on human error.  Combined, these provide the basis for the next stage of analysis.  
The next section presents five detailed explanations related to specific aspects of rail 
operations which contribute directly towards understanding why the driver believed 
SN109 was displaying an aspect which would have allowed him to proceed safely. 
 
Explanations for Signal SN109 Passed at Danger 
Explanation 1:  The driver misread the aspect of signal SN109. 
In the UK, railway signals communicate information about the upcoming 
route.  In the context of the Ladbroke Grove incident (and most of the UK rail 
network) this information is communicated using coloured lights.  Different signal 
aspects can be displayed (e.g. red, yellow, double yellow, green) which inform the 
driver of route occupancy, that is, how many signal-controlled sections of track ahead 
are clear of conflicting traffic/traffic arrangements.  The task of the driver is to 
combine this information with in-depth route knowledge to decide what action is 
appropriate.  For example, with certain types of rolling stock and in certain conditions 
a „double yellow‟ signal aspect requires no action from the driver at all.  In other 
circumstances, however, it could mean an immediate reduction in speed is required.  
This practice differs from many European countries which use speed-based signalling 
whereby a fixed behavioural response is required for any given signal aspect (e.g. a 
single yellow signal requires the driver to reduce speed to 40mph regardless of 
circumstances).   
The signalling regime applicable to the Ladbroke Grove incident is four aspect 
colour light signalling.  The four aspects (red, yellow, double yellow and green) are 
displayed by individual lens assemblies mounted in a common signal head.  The 
sequence of information that can be presented, and the possible interpretations by the 
driver, are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 – Definition of the four main signal aspects from the Master Rule Book (RS&SD, 
1999) 
Colour of signal Definition Driver interpretation  
Green Proceed  Three signalised sections of track ahead are clear 
and it is safe to maintain or accelerate to the line 
speed. 
Double yellow Proceed (but either start 
slowing down or expect 
to have to start slowing 
down at the next signal) 
Two signalised sections of track ahead are clear.  
Depending on the rolling stock and current speed, 
either begin braking or else maintain speed in 
anticipation of information conveyed by the next 
signal.  
Single yellow Proceed (but start 
slowing down in 
anticipation of having 
to stop at the next 
signal) 
Only one signalised section of track ahead is 
clear.  Continue or start to brake in order to be at 
an appropriate speed at which to stop when the 
next signal becomes visible. 
Red Stop The next signalised section of track is not clear.  
Bring the train to a complete stop in advance of 
the signal. 
 
An example of a conventional four lamp signal head is presented in Figure 2.  
Signal SN109 is also reproduced where it is important to note its unusual design, 
being shaped in the fashion of a mirrored „L‟ with the red aspect on the horizontal leg 
of the „L‟.   
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SN109Four Aspect Signal – Conventional Design  
Figure 2 – Signal aspects for a four aspect colour light signal  
 
The Ladbroke Grove inquiry concludes that the reason why the driver believed 
he had a proceed aspect at SN109 was due to “the poor sighting of SN109, both in 
itself and in comparison with the other signals on and at gantry 8, allied to the effect 
of bright sunlight at a low angle, […] which led him to believe that he had a proceed 
aspect and so that it was appropriate for him to accelerate as he did after passing 
SN87 [the previous signal]” (Cullen, 2001, pg. 2).  Clearly, the critical human 
performance requirement for trackside signals is that they are not only visible but 
understandable.  Railway Group Standards go into extensive detail regarding signal 
sighting and conspicuity, including the oft-quoted statement that “Signals shall 
normally be positioned to give drivers an approach view for a minimum of seven 
seconds and an uninterrupted view for at least four seconds” (GK/RT 0031, 2002).  
SN109 was visible to the driver for eight seconds, even with the presence of possible 
obstructions, suggesting a number of further factors relevant to the role of signalling 
in causing the Ladbroke Grove crash.   
 
1. It is important to note that apart from signals at danger, there is no 
fixed behavioural response required of the driver in respect to the route 
signalling philosophy.  The required and appropriate behaviour 
depends on many contextual factors and on the ability of the driver to 
keep track of them.   
2. The driver‟s experience was a factor that the formal inquiry examined 
in detail.  Research has shown that drivers in their first year of driving 
were most at risk from SPADs and that between 30 and 47% of SPADs 
were accounted for by drivers with less than five years experience 
(Downes & Robinson, 1999).  The research goes on to show that the 
problems are rarely to do with failures in mastering the control of the 
train, rather, the problem lies in misinterpretation of the information 
supplied to them.  With just over a month of qualified driving 
experience the driver in question clearly fell into this „at risk‟ group.  
His training and subsequent supervision were also criticized by the 
inquiry report.   
3. The driver‟s experience of the signals on Gantry 8 (on which SN109 is 
mounted) is also important.  It was stated in the inquiry report that the 
driver had only driven trains out of Paddington 20 times.  No less than 
19 of those times the signals the driver had encountered on Gantry 8 
were showing a green/proceed aspect.  The only other occasion was 
when the driver had encountered SN109 on one previous occasion, 
three days prior to the crash, in which SN109 cleared from red to green 
as the train approached.  Therefore, on no previous occasion had the 
driver been required to stop at any of the signals mounted to Gantry 8.  
In addition, the dynamics of signal aspect presentation were such as to 
favour proceed aspects.  Phenomenon like Driving Without Attention 
Mode (DWAM; May & Gale, 1998) show that it is possible for 
expectancy of a particular signal aspect to override the external cues to 
the contrary.  
 
Whilst signal sighting and conspicuity play a key role in the immediate 
approach to SN109, inconsistencies in the driver‟s behaviour had started to occur 
before the signal was visible (i.e., when compared to a notional ideal driver who 
would have been preparing to stop the train from SN63 and SN87).  This suggests that 
the driver may have started forming his belief about the upcoming aspect of SN109 
long before sighting and conspicuity issues became a factor.  Indeed, not only was the 
driver‟s behaviour towards the previous signal (SN87) inconsistent (i.e. he did not 
begin to slow down in the manner normally expected when in receipt of the AWS 
horn and double yellow at SN63, and again at the single yellow of SN87), so was that 
of a number of other drivers who had also experienced SPADs at SN109.  When 
combined, it seems that although the proximal cause of the crash was a Signal Passed 
at Danger, the distal reason was due to a previous „Signal Passed At Caution‟. 
 
Explanation 2:  The driver mistook the position line junction 
indicator at position one for an indication that he was to be routed 
onto line one. 
Where routes diverge, the route to be taken is communicated by an attendant 
line route information display.  Two principle methods are used.  1) the driver is 
supplied with alphanumeric information (i.e. a letter or number that refers to 
particular lines the driver should take), or 2) the position line junction indicator with 
rows of lights that illuminate and point to the relevant line and/or direction the train 
should take.  These two methods provide different types of information.  The 
alphanumeric displays present the absolute route in line number(s) or letter(s) whereas 
the position line junction indicator displays the relative direction.  Illustrations and 
mappings are provided in Figure 3: 
 
41 2 3 4
Alphanumeric 
Route Indicator
Mapping
Position Line 
Junction Indicator
65 4
 
Figure 3 – Alpha numeric and position line indicators with accompanying mappings 
onto track layouts.   
 
There are two important differences between the position line junction 
indicator displays and the alphanumeric displays.  Firstly, no line information is 
supplied by the position line junction indicator display if the line remains unchanged, 
whereas the alphanumeric display has the potential to display the current as well as 
diverging line.  Second, the position line junction indicator display provides relative 
line routing information, whereas the alphanumeric display provides „absolute‟ 
information about the line to be taken.  The driver may encounter both types of 
indicator display on a route, as was the case at Ladbroke Grove.  As shown in Figure 
2, the driver was presented with two alphanumeric line indications, one prior to a 
change of route (after SN17) and one serving as a reminder (SN43).  This was 
followed by no line information at the next signal (SN63), because the route remained 
unchanged, followed by the position line junction indicator at position one at SN87.   
If the driver formed a belief prior to SN109 coming into view that he had a 
proceed aspect, and subsequently did not see, or else misinterpreted the position line 
indication at SN109, then it is conceivable that an expectation could be formed that 
the train would not be diverging but proceeding on the straight ahead route.  It is 
difficult to say, based on the evidence available, whether this happened or not.  The 
facts of the situation are, however, that two different methods of position line  display 
were used with the potential to cause confusion, and that the position line indicator at 
SN109 could in fact represent one of the defences in the system, albeit a rather weak 
one.  If this is the case, then it would offer a partial explanation for the driver 
selecting notch 7 (full power) on his speed controller prior to SN109.  In other words, 
the sequence of information presented to the driver may have activated schema which 
would not have prompted him to search for relevant cues in the environment.   
 
Explanation 3:  The driver forgot to apply the DRA after signal 
SN87. 
The Driver Reminder Appliance (DRA) is an additional aid to help reduce the 
likelihood of a driver starting to move past a red signal, or a so-called Starting Against 
Signal (SAS) SPAD.  Prior to performing station duties such as operation and 
monitoring of the train doors, interacting with the guard and so forth, the driver 
pushes the DRA button in the cab as a reminder that the signal ahead is red.  The 
action of pushing the button causes a prominent red light to illuminate in the cab and 
prevents power from being drawn from the engine until it has been disengaged.   
The DRA is designed to be used in stations and can only be applied after the 
driver has selected the speed control at notch zero, the neutral position.  However, it is 
possible to activate it while the train is coasting past a signal displaying caution.  It 
can also be activated during the braking manoeuvre for a red signal itself.  In both 
cases, the speed controller is in the neutral position.  Within several train operating 
companies the practice of using the DRA on-the-move had developed, and in fact was 
seen as best practice (see Cullen, 2001 pgs 65 & 78).  Indeed, the driver who passed 
SN109 was trained by one of his on-the-job mentors to apply the DRA at signals 
displaying single yellow signal aspects.  This he did consistently on the journey into 
Paddington Station on the morning of the accident, just ten minutes before the 
outward journey began.  From this it seems reasonable to suggest that the driver 
would have normally applied the DRA at single yellow signals.  Subsequent research 
into the use of DRA on the move reveals a number of problems: 
 
1. The use of the DRA is not consistently applied at every caution signal.  
This lack of consistency could lead the driver to generate false 
expectations as to what signal is ahead.  For example, if the DRA is 
usually applied at a single yellow signal, and if the driver does not 
apply the DRA at a single yellow, they may assume that the next signal 
will not be showing a red aspect.   
2. The operation of engaging the DRA could be a significant distraction 
under certain operational scenarios.  For example, the driver may have 
to attend to other in-cab warnings simultaneously, some of which are 
more safety critical than the DRA. 
3. The DRA could be set too early in the sequence, meaning that there is 
not sufficient power to get the train to the next signal.   
4. The setting and cancelling of the DRA in a succession of caution 
signals could lead the driver to get out of sequence, resetting the DRA 
rather than setting it (McCorquodale et al, 2000). 
 One explanation related to the Ladbroke Grove crash is that the driver forgot 
to apply the DRA at SN87.  This certainly seems to be the case based on the available 
OTMR data.  For drivers who used DRA „on the move‟, application of the DRA 
would be strongly associated with the train coasting, and as the train was already 
coasting in the region of SN87, the driver could have mistakenly associated this with 
the DRA having been applied.  Upon discovering that he could in fact draw power it 
may have changed his belief about the state of SN87 and the upcoming state of 
SN109: a classic mode error.  This belief could have been further modified by 
previous experience of signal aspects displayed by SN109.   
 
Explanation 4:  The driver was cancelling the Automatic 
Warning System without proper reference to the signal aspects 
triggering the system 
McLeod, Walker and Moray (2003) describe the purpose of the Automatic 
Warning System (AWS) thus: 
 
"AWS serves two functions.  The first function is to provide an audible 
alert to direct the driver's attention to an imminent event (such as a signal or a 
sign).  The second function, linked to the first, is to provide an ongoing visual 
reminder to the driver about the last warning.  [AWS] is there to help provide 
advance notice about the nature of the route ahead, and thus communicate to 
the driver the need to slow down or stop" (p.4).   
 
AWS alerts and reminders are triggered by an electro-magnetic device placed 
between the tracks approximately 200 yards prior to the signal, sign or other event to 
which it refers.  Sensors underneath the train detect the presence of a magnetic field 
and activate AWS accordingly.  AWS has two system states, but as Table 4 shows, 
multiple referents: 
 
 
Table 4 – Summary of AWS states/referents when used in connection with four aspect colour light signalling as encountered in the region of Ladbroke 
Grove 
Note: AWS warnings are also triggered for flashing double and single yellow aspects, which occur prior to a train diverging from its current route (not applicable to the 
current situation).   
STATE OF THE 
ROUTE AHEAD 
EXTERNAL VISUAL 
INFORMATION 
AVAILABLE TO THE 
DRIVER 
AWS AUDITORY 
ALERT 
AWS VISUAL 
INDICATION 
IMMEDIATE DRIVER 
ACTION 
DRIVER BEHAVIOUR 
Three signalised sections 
of track ahead are clear 
of other traffic and the 
route is configured for 
the train 
Single green signal 
aspect 
Bell or simulated chime 
at 1200 Hz 
Display shows solid 
black 
No additional action 
required 
Proceed 
Two signalised sections 
of track ahead are clear, 
but the third is occupied 
and/or not configured 
for the train 
Double yellow signal 
aspect 
Horn sound or steady 
alarm at 800 Hz 
 
Display shows black and 
yellow 
Cancel audible alarm 
and begin to slow down 
(subject to driving 
strategy, train type 
and/or other local 
circumstances) 
Proceed with caution and 
expect to slow down 
further at the next signal 
Only the next signalised 
section of track ahead is 
clear.  The one after is 
occupied and/or not 
configured for the train 
Single yellow signal 
aspect 
Cancel audible alarm.  
Start (or continue) to 
brake 
Proceed with caution and 
anticipate having to stop 
at the next signal 
The next section of track 
is occupied and/or the 
route is not configured 
for the train 
Single red signal aspect Cancel audible alarm 
and bring train to a 
complete stop 20 metres 
before signal 
Stop and wait for further 
signal aspects to be 
displayed 
AWS is a legacy system that dates back to the 1930‟s and was originally 
conceived as a means to prevent SPADS, demonstrating that SPADs do indeed have a 
long history.  Several major accidents have seen the use of AWS, and the number of 
events it now refers to, being extended.  AWS now provides warnings in six 
circumstances:  
 
1. (Certain types of) permanent speed restriction (see next section),  
2. All temporary speed restrictions,  
3. (Some) level crossings,  
4. SPAD indicators,  
5. Cancelling boards,  
6. And other locations (such as unsuppressed track magnets, depot test 
magnets etc.).   
 
Unfortunately, the simple two state warning (bell/horn) and visual reminder (a 
black/yellow disc) are unable to discriminate between these six different events.  The 
confusion that this could cause for drivers was cited in the Ladbroke Grove inquiry 
report (Cullen, 2001).   
An unwanted AWS brake demand is a highly inconvenient event so there is 
great incentive to cancel AWS warnings quickly.  This combines with (a) the 
visibility of the AWS equipment mounted on the track, (b) the driver‟s high level of 
route knowledge and (c) the predictive manner in which trains must be driven, to 
explain the extremely quick „reaction times‟ drivers exhibit in response to AWS 
warnings.  Walker and McLeod (2003) provide some insight into this based on a 
small random sample of OTMR data.  It was observed that the mean reaction time to 
an AWS warning (the time taken between the horn being activated and the 
cancellation button being pressed) is just 0.6 seconds (min = 0.49, max = 0.89).  This 
response is so fast that the term „reaction time‟ may not be entirely appropriate.  
Rather than „reacting‟, drivers seem to be „pro-acting‟.  In-cab observations of drivers 
show them to be covering the AWS button with their hand in expectation of an AWS 
warning.  OTMR data also shows numerous occasions where driver‟s cancelled the 
AWS horn before it had even started to sound (suggestive of the driver pressing the 
button a number of times on the approach to the on-track AWS equipment, which is 
clearly visible from the train cab).  The frequency of AWS events in the Paddington 
and Ladbroke Grove area would be compatible with this behaviour, with four AWS 
events occurring in the space of 2.5 miles or just three minutes.   
The actions following an AWS warning are of further interest.  In McLeod, 
Walker and Moray‟s sample of OTMR data there were 21 AWS warnings.  Three of 
those events were followed by the brake being applied but a greater number (5) were 
followed (quite appropriately for the circumstances) by the train being accelerated.  
There is, therefore; “no single, fixed behavioural response expected of a driver when 
in receipt of an AWS warning.  Many factors specific to the driver, the class of rolling 
stock involved, the nature of the movement, and the situation at the time the warning 
occurs will determine how and when an individual driver reacts” (2003, p.9).  The 
task of the driver, therefore, is to keep track of these factors and reach a safe and 
effective decision based on them.   
On the morning of the Ladbroke Grove crash, the first signal which required 
the driver of IK20 to respond to an AWS warning was SN63.  The reaction time 
between hearing the warning and pressing the AWS cancel button was 1.15 seconds.  
At the next signal, SN87, this reaction time shortened by 0.5 seconds to 0.65 seconds.  
The same fast reaction time occurred in respect to the AWS warning at the final signal 
at danger, SN109.  In both cases, 650ms is an extremely fast response.  It is 
suggestive of the action being performed in a predictive, feed-forward manner.  What 
this response time data seems to show is a switch from deliberate feedback control 
(i.e. perceive – decide – act) to predictive feed forward control (i.e. decide – 
perceive/act) between SN63 and SN109.   
 
Explanation 5:  The driver mistook the cause of the AWS 
activation prior to signal SN109 for a triangular speed restriction. 
As a train leaves Paddington Station the line speed is initially set at 25 mph 
and a reminder of this speed restriction is placed close to the starting signal SN17, the 
first signal the driver will pass on leaving platform nine.  Subsequent speed restriction 
signs allow the driver to gradually increase their speed as they move further down the 
line.  There were five trackside speed restriction signs applicable to IK20‟s route, and 
a further five applicable to adjacent tracks.  Various group standards define where, 
and the manner in which, speed limits should be posted.  Warning signs are 
sometimes provided in advance of speed restriction signs (warning indicators are 
triangular with a yellow border whereas permanent speed limits are posted with a 
round sign and red border).  AWS is attributed to warning indicators “where the 
permissible speed on the approach is 60mph or greater and the required reduction in 
speed is one third or more of that permissible speed [..]”. (GK/RT0038, 2000 p.14).  
Although this is the case at around 1000 sites on the UK rail network (e.g. Walker & 
McLeod, 2003) this was not the case in the vicinity of SN109 even though a warning 
indicator was placed under the bridge before signal SN109.   
It is possible that from the driver‟s position in the cab that upon cancelling the 
AWS he saw the triangular speed restriction under the bridge in front of signal SN109 
and took that as the AWS trigger, rather than the signal gantry.  If the driver thought 
that the reason for the AWS was the triangular speed restriction he may not have 
searched any further for possible triggers. 
 
Critical Path Analysis 
The explanations above describe a discrete set of events which individually, 
and combined, could have played a role in the driver believing he could proceed past 
signal SN109 despite it showing a red aspect.  In this section, multi-model critical 
path analysis will be used to map these discrete events onto the accident timeline, and 
from this, attempt to draw some conclusions about why the driver behaved as he did.   
Critical Path Analysis (CPA) is a planning technique used to estimate the 
duration of projects in which some tasks can be performed in parallel.  The 
assumption is that a given task cannot start until all preceding tasks that contribute to 
it are complete.  This means that some tasks might be completed and the process is 
waiting for other tasks before it is possible to proceed.  The tasks which are completed 
but waiting for others are said to be „floating‟, i.e., they can shift their start times with 
little impact on the overall process.  Tasks that the others wait for are said to lie on the 
critical path, and any change to these tasks will have an impact on the overall process 
time.  It is possible to apply these ideas to any time-based activity, including human 
performance and the situation at Ladbroke Grove. 
As a method of modelling human performance, CPA is based on the idea that 
if two or more tasks occupied the same modality they must be performed in series, but 
if they occupied different modalities they may be performed in parallel (Olsen & 
Olsen, 1990; Baber & Mellor, 2001).  The allocation of tasks to modalities is shown 
in Table 5, along with generic task timings derived from the Key-Stroke-Level 
Method (KLM) and similar literature (Graham, 1999; Baber & Mellor, 2001; Olsen & 
Olsen; 1990). 
 
Table 5 – Allocation of tasks to modalities 
Modalities Tasks Timing Source 
Central processing Identify intervention strategy   
Visual  Look at track 
Identify signal 
Identify button 
 
340ms 
 
Baber & Mellor, 2001 
Auditory Hear warning 300ms Graham, 1999 
Manual Reach for button 
Press button 
320ms 
230ms 
Baber & Mellor, 2001 
Olsen & Olsen, 1990 
 
The tasks are put into the order of occurrence, checking the logic for parallel 
and serial tasks.  For serial tasks, the logical sequence is determined by a task 
analysis.  For parallel tasks, the sensory modality determines their placement in the 
representation.  To make the CPA easier to view, tasks of the same modality are 
always positioned in the same row in the diagram.  The time that the task may be 
performed can be found by tracing through the CPA using the longest node-to-node 
values.  Figure 4 shows the CPA model for the driver's responses to the AWS at 
signal SN63 compared to signals SN87 and SN109, where a switch from feedback to 
feed forward control is visually apparent.   
 
 Figure 7.  Critical path analysis for signal SN63 (top) and signals SN87 and 109 (bottom)
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Figure 4 – Critical path analysis of driver responses to AWS at SN63 (top) and 
SN87/SN109 (bottom) where a change of cognitive mode is visually apparent   
 
The CPA diagram is constructed from the known facts of the journey as 
described above, with detailed timings and sequences of action provided from the on-
train monitoring and recording equipment.  This analysis shows a total activity time of 
1.2 seconds for signal SN63, which is very close indeed to the actual response time of 
1.15 seconds.  Likewise, a total activity time of 0.64 seconds is found for the response 
time to signals SN87 and SN109, virtually identical once more to the observed times.  
(Total activity times are based on tracing the path of the longest response times 
through Figure 4).  Figure 4 shows that the driver‟s first response to SN109, after 
cancelling the AWS horn, was to increase speed.  It is estimated that from the first 
presentation of the AWS horn the driver would have been engaged in the tasks of 
identifying the AWS trigger (i.e., mistakenly identifying the triangular speed 
restriction) then focusing in the cab to increase the speed, then confirming that speed 
was increasing.  If the driver was expecting to cross over to the down main or down 
relief lines, he may well have been focusing on the line for the points leading to the 
crossover.   
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Figure 5 – Error types mapped on to the critical path analysis of activities in the region 
of SN109 
 
The preceding sections have provided a detailed account of the situation, 
context and plausible explanations based on these and the psychological literature.  
From this it becomes possible to extend the critical path analysis presented in Figure 5 
further back in time to show what error conditions become active prior to SN109, 
when they become active, and how they combine to defeat the last defence in the 
system (i.e. signal SN109).  From Figure 5 it can be argued that a combination of a 
loss-of-activation (i.e. the failure to use the DRA after passing signal SN87 leading 
the driver to forget its aspect) created the conditions for a mode error (i.e. the 
realisation that power could be drawn and a consequent change in expectation as to 
future events) coupled with a data-driven-activation error (i.e. interpreting the AWS 
activation trigger as the triangular speed restriction sign under the bridge before signal 
SN109).  These conditions would be sufficient to cause the driver to proceed past 
SN109 even though it was showing danger.  Moreover, this sequence of events fits the 
timeline of actual events and would render such behaviour as „locally rational‟ on the 
part of the driver.   
 
Conclusions 
Despite the Ladbroke Grove accident taking place over ten years ago, and 
despite a wide range of interventions and changes to the industry as a direct result, 
SPADs still occur.  Ladbroke Grove is now something of a classic case study, yet 
regardless of a seemingly exhaustive and in-depth analysis, the inquiry itself was not 
able to reach a definitive answer as to why the driver in question believed he could 
proceed past SN109 despite it showing danger.  The inquiry recognised this as an 
open question with its 19th formal recommendation (out of 89) being:  “Further 
research should be carried out to develop the understanding of human factors as they 
relate to train driving” (Cullen, 2000, p. 229).   
The simplest answer as to why the driver in question passed SN109 at danger 
is that he simply misread the aspect.  As such, the issue becomes one of signal 
sighting and conspicuity, an issue which rightly informs many human factors and 
engineering interventions.  But this simplistic answer is unsatisfactory in this case.  
The clue to deeper, more psychologically orientated factors lies not only in the fact 
that many SPADs occur in conditions of perfect sighting and conspicuity, but in this 
case, that a number of subtle behaviour changes were detected well in advance of the 
signal passed at danger.  To probe these deeper issues this paper considers the actions 
of the driver, the behaviour of the train, the technology used, the context of rail 
operations, and the underpinning psychological and technological issues.  Compatible 
with Lawton and Ward‟s previous work in this area we take a broader systems view 
but this time we take that view in conjunction with the literature on human error, 
distributed and situated cognition.  Via this approach it is possible to arrive at a 
specific multi-causal explanation of why the driver in question passed signal SN109 at 
danger and, moreover, why it may have made sense to him to do so in those 
circumstances.  It is proposed that the following error types could have combined to 
create a form of local rationality for the driver: a combination of loss-of-activation 
(i.e. the failure to use the DRA after passing signal SN87 ultimately led the driver to 
forgetting its aspect) created the conditions for a mode error (i.e. the realisation that 
power could be drawn and a consequent change in expectation as to future events) 
coupled with a data-driven-activation error (i.e. attributing the AWS activation trigger 
to the triangular speed restriction sign under the bridge before signal SN109).  Taken 
together, these factors offer a plausible explanation for a seemingly implausible set of 
behaviours.   
The next question, simply stated, is what can be done.  There are several 
aspects of system design relevant to reducing the likelihood of these errors, many of 
which have already been actioned as a result of Ladbroke Grove.  This includes 
eliminating the use of DRA on-the-move, integrating the line-side signals into the 
drivers‟ cab interfaces, and separating the warning sounds and visual indicators for 
different stimuli.  Following the accident, the use of DRA on-the-move was indeed 
halted (McCorquodale et al, 2002).  The rail industry‟s long term ambition to place 
signals in the cab, and provide better discrimination between warnings, is subsumed 
under the European Rail Traffic Management (ERTMS) system.  These outcomes are 
consistent with the current findings as well as those of the official inquiry and in 
themselves are not especially novel.   
Whilst specific error types can be attributed to specific items of infrastructure, 
and that infrastructure changed in order to prevent those errors occurring, it is evident 
from this work that such a deterministic approach may still leave gaps in system 
defences.  What the present findings show, above all, is how errors combine over 
time, multiply rather than add together, and emerge in forms that are not only 
extremely difficult to predict but which cause a form of local rationality for those on 
the operational front line, preventing them from providing significant insight into their 
own behaviour.  So whilst the present paper provides support for the many 
interventions that have flowed from the Ladbroke Grove crash it is possible to go 
further. 
The problem with high reliability transport modes, such as rail, is that quite 
often major accidents occur and interventions are put in place that are not necessarily 
well evolved to the situation they are being placed in.  Evolution requires time 
whereas accident investigations require decisive action, and usually a deterministic 
approach to the management of errors.  This is clearly evident in several important 
aspects of rail operations.  For example, the problem of the simple two state AWS 
system with multiple warning referents arises from previous accident investigations 
which recommended the use of AWS being extended beyond its original design.  A 
further irony is that a system designed to overcome certain types of SPAD, the DRA, 
may have played a part in causing the SPAD at Ladbroke Grove.  The use of lagging 
indicators to inform the design of infrastructure, therefore, tends to deal with „known 
unknowns‟ simply because they have revealed themselves in the course of a major 
incident.  The real challenge for high reliability transport domains lies elsewhere, in 
the extended pre-accident timeline and the conditions which exist in the system which 
enable as yet unknown error types to emerge in the future.   
This paper supports the concept of Train Data Monitoring.  Instead of using 
the data which informed the inquiry and analysis into Ladbroke Grove „after the 
event‟, an opportunity now exists (with on train monitoring and recording now 
mandatory) to use it „before the event‟.  That is, to use it in a manner similar to the 
mature Flight Data Monitoring programmes within the aviation industry, whereby 
data on routine journeys is collected and assembled into a central source (CAA, 
2008).  By these means, very subtle out of specification events of the sort discussed in 
this paper can be detected before they manifest themselves as a serious safety 
concern.  Furthermore, it has become apparent through this paper that it is eminently 
possible to drive human factors methods such as CPA using this type of data.  For 
example, it would be possible to identify particular locations where sequences of 
actions deviate from accepted good practice.  It would also be possible to identify 
changes in mode, from feedback to feed forward control using aggregated industry 
data on reaction times.  This data could then be used to inform engineering, training 
and/or procedural interventions which, in turn, could be monitored to test their effect.  
In conclusion, the work presented in this paper motivates an ongoing programme of 
research into the concept of Rail Data Monitoring and the ability to use on train 
monitoring and recording outputs to drive human factors methods.   
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